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Abstract
This paper proposes a new framework to identify the effects of the minimum wage on the
joint distribution of sector and wages in a developing country. I show that under reasonable
assumptions, cross-sectional data on the worker's wage and sector can identify the joint 
distribution of the latent counterparts of these variables; that is, the sector status and wage that
would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage. I apply the method in the “PNAD”, a
nationwide representative Brazilian cross-sectional dataset for the years 2001 to 2009. The
results indicate that the size of the informal sector is increased by around 39% compared to what
would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage, an effect attributable to (i) unemployment
effects of the minimum wage on the formal sector, (ii) movements of workers from the formal to 
the informal sector as a response to the policy.
JEL No. J60, J30, J31
Keywords:Minimum wage, informality, unemployment, density discontinuity design, wage
inequality, labor tax revenues, formal sector
Hugo Jales, Department of Economics and Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University, 426 
Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, hbjales@maxwell.syr.edu
*I am grateful to Thomas Lemieux for his advice during this project. This paper benefited from
extensive discussions with Joseph Doyle, Nicole Fortin, David Green, Vadim Marmer, Craig 
Riddell, Pierre Brochu, Alfonso Flores-Lagunes and Sergio Firpo. I also thank the participants at
the ESEM, EALE, IAAE, CLSRN, SBE and CEA conferences and the participants at the EESP-
FGV, UFMG, UBC and SFU academic seminars for helpful suggestions that improved the
quality of this paper. All remaining errors are my own. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite its widespread use, controversy persists regarding the economic impact of 
the minimum wage. A simple one-sector competitive market model predicts that a 
minimum wage will generate unemployment when the minimum exceeds the market-
clearing wage. However, if the employer has market power, then a minimum wage can 
lead to an increase in wages and employment. In an economy with a large informal 
sector, where some employers do not comply with the minimum wage policy, the min-
imum wage might not generate unemployment effects even in the absence of market 
power on the part of the employer. This will hold as long as the workers can freely 
migrate from one sector to the other and the informal sector is sufficiently large to 
accommodate such movements. 
These conflicting theoretical predictions provide a strong motivation for empirical 
studies on the effects of minimum wage policies. In this paper, I develop a Dual-
economy model based on Meyer and Wise (1983) to assess the impacts of the minimum 
wage on (a) unemployment, (b) average wages, (c) wage inequality, (d) sector mobility, 
(e) the size of the informal sector, and (f) labor tax revenues. I model the joint 
distribution of wages and sectors (latent and observed), as opposed to the marginal 
distribution of wages, as in Meyer and Wise (1983). A model for the joint distribution 
of sector and wages allows me to infer the size of the formal sector that would prevail 
in the absence of the minimum wage and compute the proportion of workers who 
move to the informal sector in response to the policy. I provide the conditions for 
identifying the Dual-economy model parameters and the latent joint distribution of 
sector and wages, that is, the distribution that would prevail in the absence of the 
minimum wage policy. My identification strategy relies on the discontinuity in wage 
density at the minimum wage and the differences in the response to the minimum 
wage between the formal and informal sectors. 
This paper’s contributions to the literature are the following: (i) I document key 
empirical facts concerning the relationship between formal and informal wage distri-
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butions that have been overlooked in previous research, namely, the similarity between 
these distributions conditional on values above the minimum wage; (ii) I provide a 
novel identification strategy that combines a non-parametric density discontinuity 
design with a parametric model for the conditional probability of sector given the 
wage. In particular, I show that under reasonable conditions, the parameters that 
describe the effects of the minimum wage and the underlying latent joint distribution 
of sector and wages are identified using only cross-sectional data. (iii) I estimate a 
sector mobility parameter, the probability that a worker in the formal sector moves 
to the informal sector in response to the minimum wage; (iv) I demonstrate how to 
test some of the assumptions invoked to identify the parameters of the model and 
I show that these assumptions hold in the empirical application; (v) I estimate the 
effect of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of sector and wages and estimate 
the effect of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first paper that attempts to identify both the latent share of the formal 
sector and the effects of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues. 
The identification problem studied in this paper includes minimum wage policies as 
a special case. In general, any policy that introduces a boundary type of restriction 
can potentially be analyzed under this framework. Examples of such policies are 
price floors, price ceilings, and age restrictions (such as the restrictions for alcohol 
and tobacco consumption). These policies will typically affect the size of the market, 
the distribution of quality of the good, taxes, and induce some transactions to occur 
“off the table” (and by so increase the size of a “black” market). This paper provides 
a set of assumptions and data requirements under which it is possible to identify the 
effects of such policies on these outcomes. 
The model is estimated using the years 2001 to 2009 from “Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de Domićılios” (PNAD), a dataset comprising repeated cross sections of 
an annual household survey that is representative of the Brazilian population. I find 
that the probability of a formal worker switching to the informal sector as a result of 
3 
the policy is small – approximately 12%. The combined effect of unemployment and 
transitions to the informal sector generated by the introduction of the minimum wage 
leads to an 9% decrease in the size of the formal sector relative to the counterfactual 
state defined by the absence of the minimum wage. This associated growth in the 
size of the informal sector as a result of the policy is 39% - an effect attributable to 
the fact that the latent formal sector is four times larger than the informal sector of 
the economy. Unemployment effects of the minimum wage are, as expected, highly 
correlated with the real value of the minimum wage. Moreover, the minimum wage 
strongly affects average wages (promoting an increase of approximately 16%), wage 
inequality (an approximately -19% effect on the standard deviation of log wages and 
a -24% impact on the Gini Index), and labor tax revenues (-6%). 
2. BACKGROUND 
In Brazil, all workers are required to carry a government document called a 
“Carteira de Trabalho”, or worker’s card. This document, introduced in 1932, serves 
as proof of the worker’s legal employment status. If a worker is formally employed 
in the Brazilian labor market, then his contract is signed by the employer on a page 
of the worker’s card. This labor contract implies that the worker’s employment is in 
compliance with labor taxes and labor regulations such as the minimum wage. Formal 
employment gives the worker access to benefits that include unemployment insurance 
and severance payments. 
Not all labor contracts are signed by the employer and included in the worker’s 
card. When an employer and a worker agree to a labor contract but decide not to 
formally sign it and include it in the worker’s card, the worker’s employment is called 
informal. Reasons for the existence of informal contracts include the evasion of labor 
regulations, such as the payment of labor taxes, compliance with the minimum wage, 
job safety standards, and restrictions on hours worked per week.1 This definition of 
1Firms face a trade-off between the costs of complying with the regulation and the probabil-
ity/magnitude of punishment. The firms’ decision to hire formal versus informal workers was inves-
tigated in Almeida and Carneiro (2012), and Mattos and Ogura (2009). 
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informality is tightly related to compliance with the minimum wage. However, these 
concepts are not equivalent. A worker with a wage below the minimum wage level 
is surely an informal worker. However, a worker whose wage is above the minimum 
wage may be formal or informal depending on whether his contract is signed by the 
employer.2 The proportion of private sector workers between the ages of 19 and 59 
who are employed in the formal sector is .74. In other words, more than one quarter of 
private sector workers do not have a signed contract included in their worker’s card. 
The minimum wage in Brazil has been set at the federal level since 1984. In theory, 
all jobs are covered, meaning that the (same) minimum wage level should apply to 
every worker. In practice, coverage only extends to workers with a contract written 
on the worker’s card (Lemos, 2009). A unified minimum wage set at the federal level 
with full coverage complicates the task of finding an appropriate control group. This 
is because cross-border differences-in-differences analysis, such as that in Card and 
Krueger (1994), is ruled out as a practical option, as the same level prevails in all 
states. Another feature of the minimum wage changes in Brazil is that since 2005, 
they have been linked to inflation and GDP growth, which poses further challenges to 
the use of time-series variation to estimate the effects of the minimum wage. Under 
these conditions, it is more difficult to disentangle the effects of the minimum wage 
from other sources of changes in the wage distribution that are linked to changes in 
economic activity. 
Despite these challenges, it is nevertheless possible to identify the effect of the min-
imum wage using only cross-sectional data on sector and wages. This paper describes 
a set of a priori restrictions – on the joint distribution of sector and wage, and on 
the effects of the policy – that allows for identification of the effects of the minimum 
wage using only cross-sectional data on sector and wages. This research design is well 
suited to analyze markets characterized by the absence of cross-sectional or time se-
ries variation on the policy level that can be used for identification, such as the case 
2As we will discuss in greater detail below, approximately 20% of the workers whose wages are 
above the minimum are informal workers. 
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of the minimum wage in the Brazilian labor market.3 
The points of departure for this paper are the works of Meyer and Wise (1983) and 
Doyle (2006). These papers show how to identify the effects of the minimum wage 
on the distribution of wages. I extend their model to a two-sector, or dual-economy, 
setting with sector mobility. This allows wages in both sectors to be affected, but in 
different ways, by the minimum wage. It also allows me to capture the effects of the 
minimum wage on the size of the formal sector and other related outcomes, such as 
labor tax revenues. 
The dual-economy extension I develop presents new challenges for identification. 
This is because the techniques presented in Doyle (2006) are not sufficient to recover 
the sector-specific parameters of the model in this general version. The reason is that 
applying Doyle’s strategy to the aggregate economy only recovers a weighted average 
of the parameters, which will be uninformative for most of the outcomes of interest. 
Applying his method to each sector separately is not feasible, as workers have moved 
from one sector to the other as a result of the policy. Thus, one of the contributions 
of this paper is demonstrating how to identify the effects of the minimum wage in 
this dual-economy setting. 
In the next sections, I briefly describe the models of Meyer and Wise (1983) and 
Doyle (2006) to highlight the similarities and differences between their papers and 
the approach followed here. 
3. MODEL 
The effect of the minimum wage on a worker’s wage is the difference between his 
wage under the policy and the wage he would receive in its absence. The fundamental 
problem of causal evaluation is that this difference is conceptually well defined but 
3The assumptions made to address the question of interest will not be in terms of agents’ prefer-
ences, technology or equilibrium mechanisms; rather, they will be in terms of the relationship between 
latent and observed variables. In this sense, the identification is semi-structural. It is structural in 
the sense that it relies on assumptions concerning the effects of the policy and semi-structural in 
the sense that those assumptions can be satisfied by a wide set of different fully specified structural 
models. 
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never observed in the data. This is true because we can at most observe the wages for 
each worker in one of the two possible states of the world. However, it is nevertheless 
helpful to consider these objects. Thus, let worker i be characterized by an observed 
wage Wi(1) and a corresponding latent wage Wi(0), which is defined as the wage 
that the worker would receive in the absence of the minimum wage. I will denote the 
minimum wage level by m. I will denote by F0(w) (f0(w)) the CDF (pdf) of latent 
wages. Similarly, denote by F (w) (f(w)) the CDF (pdf) of observed wages. To keep 
the model as simple as possible, assume that these workers come from a population 
with similar observable characteristics, and hence, we do not need to control for 
these characteristics. In the absence of the minimum wage, every worker i in this 
population obtains a draw Wi(0) from the distribution F0, which I will refer to as 
the underlying wage distribution or the distribution of “market” wages. Although 
workers are intrinsically homogeneous ex-ante, meaning that they draw their wages 
from the same distribution, they will have different wages ex-post. 
In the presence of the minimum wage policy, the worker will receive a draw Wi(1) 
from the distribution F , which I will refer to as the distribution of observed wages.4 
To make the problem of identifying the effects of the minimum wage tractable, I 
follow Meyer and Wise by imposing a set of a priori restrictions on the distribution of 
the latent variables and on the effects of the policy.5 As we will see, these restrictions 
allow me to identify the effects of the policy without relying on exogenous policy 
variations or time-series data. 
4The most flexible way to model the effects of the minimum wage in the wage distribution is to 
assume that each worker can potentially be affected by the policy. If we consider wages in terms of 
a discrete variable, the effects of the minimum wage on the distribution of wages can be completely 
characterized by a matrix of transitions that govern the probability that a worker at any point 
w of the latent wage distribution will end up at any point w0 in the observed wage distribution. 
That is, a completely general (and, by construction, correctly specified) model for the effects of the 
minimum wage on the wage distribution is a transition matrix in which every entry is given by 
Pr[W (1) = w0|W (0) = w]. 
5I discuss in Section 6.4 and in Appendix D how to indirectly test the validity of these a priori 
restrictions. 
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3.1. The Meyer and Wise Approach 
This section describes the assumptions and estimation strategy used by Meyer and 
Wise (1983). Assume that the econometrician observes a random sample of observed 
wages {Wi(1)} of size N from a population of interest.6 Let the following hold: 
Assumption MW1 The latent wage is log-normally distributed. That is, 
log(W (0)) ∼ N(µ, σ2). 
Assumption MW2 There are no spillovers from the minimum wage. This means 
that W (1) = W (0) when W (0) > m. 
Assumption MW3 If W (0) < m, then with probability πm, the worker receives the 
minimum wage (W (1) = m). With probability πd, (W (1) = W (0)), the worker’s wage 
is the same as the latent wage (non-compliance). With the complementary probability 
πu = 1 − πm − πd, the worker becomes unemployed (W (1) = ·). 7 
The probabilities (πm, πd, πu) represent the likelihood of receiving the minimum 
wage, non-compliance and unemployment. These parameters arise so naturally in the 
context of the minimum wage that it is occasionally difficult to recognize how they 
restrict the model in any way. They seem to resemble a list of all possible outcomes. 
This is not the case, however. The restrictions imposed by defining these probabilities 
are as follows: (i) Pr[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0, that is, no worker whose market 
wage is below the minimum wage will receive a wage greater than the minimum wage 
when the policy is introduced; (ii) the probabilities πd, πm and πu are not a function 
of the worker’s latent wage, such as, for example, a function of how far they are from 
6Note that this is a non-standard policy evaluation problem in which all individuals are treated 
(Wi = Wi(1)), meaning that the (same) minimum wage level holds for everyone in the population. 
The absence of a control group forces the use of a model to identify the effects of the policy. 
7Strictly speaking, the appropriate expression should be “non-employment”. I will refer to this 
effect as the “unemployment” effect of the minimum wage. Throughout the paper I will use non-
employment and unemployment interchangeably, given that the model cannot distinguish these 
effects. 
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the minimum wage; and (iii) workers who do not comply with the policy retain the 
same wage, that is, Wi(1) = Wi(0).8,9 
The goal of the exercise is to recover the parameters of the underlying latent 
distribution of market wages (µ, σ) and the parameters (πd, πm, πu) that govern 
how the minimum wage affects the economy. The key contribution of Meyer and 
Wise is to show that those parameters are identified using data on observed wages 
(Wi(1)). Perhaps surprisingly, one need not have any variation in the policy to re-
cover its effects. To observe how this is achieved, define the log-likelihood of observing 
πmF0(m)πdf0(w)Wi(1) = w as: log L(Wi = w|µ, σ, π) = 1I{w < m} log +1I{w = m} log c + c 
f0(m)1I{w > m} log , where 1I{A} is the indicator function of the event A and c ≡ 
c 
1 − πuF0(m) is a rescaling factor that ensures that the observed density of wages inte-
grates to one. The parameter c can be interpreted as the ratio of employment before 
and after the introduction of the policy. Meyer and Wise use maximum-likelihood to 
estimate the parameters of the model. An intuitive way to think about the identifica-
tion is to recognize that the model allows us to use the information on wages above 
the minimum wage level to predict the shape of the wage distribution in the absence 
of the policy.10 
8At first glance, the restriction (i) may not appear problematic, as it is difficult to imagine why 
someone would comply with the policy by increasing a worker’s wage to a value greater than m. 
This is not impossible, however. An example of a model that is excluded by this assumption is that 
of Teulings (2000). 
9Restriction (ii) can be relaxed in certain ways, for example, by making the probabilities 
(πd, πm, πu) low-order polynomials of the worker’s latent wage. Restriction (iii) can be relaxed 
without affecting the identification strategy by making the worker draw from the distribution of 
market wages conditional on values below the minimum wage. Changes to the average wages of 
those who do not comply with the policy also can be incorporated. However, this change requires 
some modifications in the identification strategy. 
10A closer inspection on the likelihood function shows that Meyer and Wise’s approach nests 
“standard measurement”, truncation and censoring of the wages below the threshold m. If πu is 
equal to one, the likelihood function of Meyer and Wise’s model is the same as the likelihood of a 
truncation model. If πm is equal to one, the likelihood of the model is the same as the likelihood 
of a Tobit model (censoring). If the probability of non-compliance πd is equal to one, the likelihood 
becomes the standard likelihood of a normal distribution, with no censoring or truncation. Moreover, 
the probabilities of “measurement”, truncation and censoring have a direct economic interpretation 
as different responses of the economy to the minimum wage policy. 
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3.2. Doyle’s Approach 
A limitation of Meyer and Wise’s (1983) approach is that it relies on a paramet-
ric assumption concerning the latent wage distribution.11 The contribution of Doyle 
(2006) is to show that this is not actually necessary for identification when one is 
only willing to assume continuity in the distribution of latent wages. The key idea 
behind this strategy is that the continuity of the distribution of latent wages implies 
that the ratio of the density of observed wages just above and below the minimum 
wage identifies πd, the likelihood of non-compliance with the policy.12 In this section, 
I discuss the identification of the minimum wage effects under the model proposed 
by Doyle (2006). In the following discussion, I will maintain assumptions MW2 (no 
spillovers) and MW3 (minimum wage effects) from Meyer and Wise (1983). Again, 
assume that the econometrician only observes wages in the presence of the policy; 
that is, a random sample of size N from the distribution of {Wi(1)} is available. 
Assumption D1 The density of latent wages is continuous at m. That is, 
limw→m+ f0(w) = limw→m− f0(w). 
As discussed in Doyle (2006), this assumption exploits the fact that the distri-
bution of worker productivity is likely to be smooth, but the observed density of 
wages has a jump around the minimum wage. This jump can provide exactly the 
information necessary to trace back the effects of the policy on the outcomes of 
interest. Under assumptions MW2 and MW3, there is a relationship between the 
latent and observed distribution of wages. This relationship is given by: f(w) = 
1I{w < m}πdf
c 
0(w) + 1I{w = m}πmF
c 
0(w) + 1I{w > m}f0(
c
w) , where c = 1 − πuF0(m), as 
before. Figure 1 provides a graphical example of the relationship between the observed 
and the latent densities. Taking the ratio of the density of observed wages just below 
and above the minimum wage, that is, considering the lateral limits of the density at 
11The sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the parametric assumptions was studied in 
Dickens, Machin and Manning (1998). 
12Given the similarity between this identification strategy and RD Designs, Doyle (2006) termed 
it a density discontinuity design. 
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Figure 1.— Doyle’s Model 
πdf0(w)lim − f(w) lim −w→m w→m cm, we have = = πd, where the last equality is obtained lim w→m+ f (w) + f0(w)lim w→m c 
using assumption D1. Figure 2 graphically depicts the mechanics of the estimation 
of the non-compliance probability. To recover the remaining parameters, it is easy 
to see that by integrating the density of observed wages up to the minimum wage, 
πdF0(m) Pr[W (1)=m] πm 13we have Pr[W (1) < m] = . Then, we have = . Because the 
c Pr[W (1)<m] πd 
left-hand side of this equation is identified from the data and the right-hand side is 
a function of only one unknown, this implies that πm is identified. This also implies 
that πu = 1 − πd − πm is identified. To recover the latent density of wages, one needs 
to recover F0(m). This is the case because the relationship between the observed and 
latent densities can be inverted once we know the rescaling factor c. To see this, note: 
f0(w) = 
f(w)·c if w < m , and f0(w) = f(w) · c if w > m.πd 
Pr[W (1)<m]One way to identify F0(m) is to use the fact that F0(m) = ,Pr[W (1)<m]+πdPr[W (1)>m] 
Pr[W (1)<m] πdF0(m)/cwhich follows from: = = 
Pr[W (1)<m]+πdPr[W (1)>m] πdF0(m)/c+πd(1−F0(m))/c 
F0(m) = F0(m). This implies that the latent distribution of wages canF0(m)+1−F0(m) 
be recovered under assumptions D1, MW1, and MW2. The discontinuity in the 
13Interestingly, the identification of πm also can be understood in terms of a discontinuity. The ratio 
πm/πd is identified by a discontinuity in the distribution of wages at the m. Thus, the identification 
of Doyle’s model uses a discontinuity in the CDF of wages to identify πm/πd and a discontinuity in 
the density of wages to identify πd. 
11 
Figure 2.— Doyle’s Model: Identification 
observed distribution around the minimum wage identifies the probability of non-
compliance with the policy πd. 14 This in turn allows us to recover πm, F0(m) and, 
consequently, the entire latent wage distribution.15 
3.3. Minimum Wage Effects in a Dual Economy 
The Brazilian economy, similar to those of many other developing countries, is 
characterized by a large informal sector. In Brazil, an informal worker is defined as a 
worker whose worker’s card does not include a signed labor contract. Informality is 
thought to arise in developing countries as a result of restrictive and costly labor laws. 
Note that once the worker’s card is signed, the collection of labor taxes should follow 
and compliance with minimum wage and other labor standards has to be assured. 
A natural question that arises in this context is the following: What is the role of 
14Each step after the identification of πd from the limit of the ratio of densities relies on the 
assumption that this probability is not a function of the wage. This feature contrasts with the 
parametric model of Meyer and Wise. By restricting the set of latent wage distributions, more 
flexibility can be introduced in the functional form of the relationship between the latent wage W (0) 
and the model parameter πd. This is the case because the shape of the latent wage distribution can 
be recovered in the parametric setting using the information above the minimum wage. This allows 
us to identify not only a probability of non-compliance but also a function πd(w) that maps wages 
to non-compliance probabilities. This function need not be constant with respect to latent wages. 
15Doyle’s model can be identified under the assumption that πd is a low-order polynomial of the 
latent wage. However, in this case, identification can only be achieved by using derivatives of the 
wage density at the minimum wage level. 
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the minimum wage in a economy with such a large informal sector? A large fraction 
of contracts outside the “umbrella” of the labor laws may be a consequence of the 
minimum wage, meaning that many workers (intentionally or not) have moved to the 
informal sector as a consequence of the minimum wage policy. However, in principle, 
it could also be the case that the observed proportion of workers in the informal 
sector is completely unrelated to the level of the minimum wage. Informality may 
instead depend on labor taxes and other forms of labor regulation (hours worked, job 
safety standards and so forth) that have to be met regardless of where the worker 
is located in the wage distribution. These two explanations have markedly different 
policy implications but are in principle equally plausible explanations for the observed 
size of the informal sector. One of the goals of this paper is to assess the relative 
importance of these explanations. 
To do so, I generalize the models of Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006) to the 
case of a dual economy. I model the joint distribution of wages and sectors (latent and 
observed), as opposed to the marginal distribution of wages. This allows me to infer 
the size of the formal sector that would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage 
and compute the proportion of workers who move to the informal sector in response 
to the policy. 
Let worker i be characterized by a pair of wage (Wi(1)) and sector (Si(1)), which 
is equal to one if he is employed in the formal sector and zero otherwise. Compliance 
with minimum wage legislation is perfect in the formal sector but not in the informal 
sector. This effectively means that the workers in the formal sector are not allowed 
to have wages below the minimum wage once the policy is introduced. If they remain 
employed in the presence of the policy, they must either move to an informal contract 
or comply with the policy by receiving a wage equal to m. In addition, for each 
worker, define a pair (Wi(0), Si(0)) that denotes the counterfactual - or latent - wage 
and sector in the absence of the minimum wage. Finally, define F0(w) (f0(w)) as the 
c.d.f (p.d.f) of W (0) and F (w) (f(w)) as the c.d.f (p.d.f) of observed wages (Wi(1) 
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or, in short notation, Wi). I will assume that the latent wage and sector distribution 
have the following characteristics: 
Assumption 1 (Continuity) The density of latent wages and its first derivative are 
continuous at m. That is, limw→m+ f0(w) = limw→m− f0(w), and limw→m+ f0
0 (w) = 
limw→m− f0
0 (w). 
Because this is a model of the joint distribution of sector and wages, we need to 
define another object, Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w]: 
Assumption 2 (Conditional probability of (latent) sector given the wage) The con-
ditional distribution of latent sector given the latent wage belongs to a parametric 
family {Λ(w, β) : β ∈ B ⊂ Rk}. That is, Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Λ(w, β) for some 
β0 ∈ B. Moreover, Pr[Λ(W (0), β0) 6 6= Λ(W (0), β0)|W (0) > m] > 0 for all β0 = β0. 
With the conditional probability of latent sector (given the wage) and the marginal 
distribution of latent wages, we have completely specified the joint distribution of 
these variables.16 The restrictive part of this assumption is that the conditional prob-
ability of the latent sector given latent wages can be described by a parametric model. 
The first part of the above assumption states that there is a parameter β for which 
the probability of the latent sector given the latent wage w is exactly equal to Λ(w, β). 
The second part of the assumption ensures that there is only one parameter for which 
this condition holds. Both assumptions are standard in models with binary outcomes. 
For concreteness, assume that the parametric model is a logit.17,18 
16This joint distribution could come, for example, from a Roy-type model of sector choice, in 
which workers would choose the sector that yields the highest utility. Another model would be one 
in which workers are assigned to firms that, based on labor taxes and probability of punishment, 
decide whether they will employ formal or informal workers. 
17The logistic functional form is assumed only for clarity in the exposition. All identification 
results are preserved if the logistic functional form is replaced by another parametric form, such as 
a probit. Moreover, one can make the model flexible by adding higher-order polynomials of wages 
(squares and cubes) as regressors in the logit to better adjust the curve. As long as the degree k of 
the polynomial is fixed with respect to the sample size, that is, the model remains parametric, the 
identification results will hold. 
18The reason for the need of a parametric model, as will become clear in the identification section, 
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Assumption 3 (No spillovers) Workers whose latent wages would be above the min-
imum wage are not affected by the policy. That is, W (1) = W (0) and S(1) = S(0) 
when W (0) > m. 
This assumption is potentially strong. In the non-parametric framework, this as-
sumption is also untestable. However, it is straightforward to see that the model is 
still identified under any known and invertible spillover function. Moreover, bounds 
can be computed for the parameters when positive spillovers are assumed to exist and 
the researcher has no prior information on their size.19 Furthermore, spillovers can 
also be identified and estimated if one is willing to assume a parametric family for 
the latent wage distribution. In the empirical application I investigate the robustness 
of my results to the presence of limited spillovers. 
To complete the model we need to define the minimum wage effects in the lower-
tail of the wage distribution. As discussed by Meyer and Wise, workers in sectors 
operating in competitive markets whose wages would be below the minimum might 
become unemployed as a result of the minimum wage. If there is some bargaining 
involved in the wage determination, or if the employers hold market power, some 
workers will “cluster” at the minimum as a result of the policy. Finally, because 
compliance with the minimum is imperfect in some markets, workers might migrate 
from the formal to the informal sector to avoid unemployment. In terms of the model, 
this leads to the following assumption: 
Assumption 4 (Minimum wage effects) For wages below the minimum wage 
(W (0) < m), we have the following: If S(0) = 0, then S(1) = S(0). Moreover, 
(0)
with probability πd , the wage continues to be observed (W (1) = W (0)). With the 
(0) (0)
complementary probability πm = 1 − πd , the worker earns the minimum wage 
is that this model induces censoring in the probabilities of working in the formal sector for wages 
below the minimum wage. This forces us to rely on extrapolation using values above the minimum 
to identify the share of formal workers for low wages. The need for extrapolation excludes non-
parametric methods as an option. 
19See Appendix E.5 for further discussion of this issue. 
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(W (1) = m). 20 If S(0) = 1, then with probability πd 
(1) 
, the wage continues to 
be observed (W (1) = W (0)), meaning that the worker successfully transits from 
the formal sector to the informal sector.21 In this case, the observed sector will be 
(1)
S(1) = 0, being different from the latent sector. With probability πm , the worker 
earns the minimum wage (W (1) = m, S(1) = 1). With the complementary probability 
(1) (1) (1)
(πu = 1 − πd − πm ), the worker becomes unemployed (W (1) = ·, S(1) = ·). 22 
3.4. Discussion 
The goal of the exercise is to recover the unknown parameters π ≡ 
(1) (1) (1) (0) (0)
)0(πd , πm , πu , πd , πm and the joint distribution of latent sector and wages, that 
is, the joint density that would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage. By com-
paring this distribution with the observed distribution, I can evaluate the impact of 
the minimum wage on expected wages, wage inequality, employment and other labor 
market outcomes. By defining the latent sector and the sector-specific parameters, 
a broader range of implications of the minimum wage becomes assessable, such as 
changes in tax revenues and movements between sectors. In Sections 3.5 and 6.3, I 
will discuss in detail how the minimum wage affects these outcomes. 
The assumptions used in this model are similar to the assumptions used previously 
in this literature. I maintain all assumptions from Doyle – or Meyer and Wise, if one 
(0)20The reason for allowing πm to be greater than zero, that is, to allow workers in the informal 
sector to cluster at the minimum wage, is for the model to account for the empirical fact that they 
seem to do so. The informal sector wage distribution presents a spike similar to the formal sector 
distribution at the minimum wage. The economic logic behind this regularity is under debate. One 
hypothesis is that the minimum wage acts as a signal to the agents of a fair price for unskilled labor, 
which might affect the way workers in the informal sector bargain with their employers. This feature 
seems to be related to the “self-enforcing” nature of the minimum wage. 
21The assumption that the wage remains exactly the same when the worker moves to the informal 
sector, that is (W (1) = W (0)), substantially simplifies the exposition. The same results hold when 
this assumption is replaced with one in which the worker draws a new wage from f0(w|S(0) = 
1,W (0) < m). 
(1) (1)22To ease the exposition, I have assumed that πm and πu do not vary as a function of the latent 
wage. In this case in which they vary over the latent wages, the parameter recovered by assuming 
(1) (1)
that they are constants is the expectation of the distribution of πm and πu over the distribution 
(1)
of wages below the minimum. This result holds only as long as π remains constant as a function d 
of the wage. 
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prefers a parametric specification for latent wages – and generalize their approach 
to address sector-specific responses. Assumption 4, the assumption that defines the 
sector-specific effects of the minimum wage, implies the assumptions used by Meyer 
and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006) concerning the marginal distribution of wages. 
That is, the marginal distribution of wages (which is obtained after integrating out 
the sector-specific wage distributions) will resemble the density of wages that appears 
in Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006). 
Despite these similarities, there are numerous advantages of using a model for the 
joint distribution of sector and wages. This is especially true for developing countries, 
where the informal sector plays an important role in the economy. This model ac-
commodates a variety of responses of the economy to the minimum wage policy. The 
model allows for the standard unemployment effect. The model allows the minimum 
wage to have a “supporting” effect on the lower tail of the wage distribution in such a 
way that the policy can affect average wages and wage inequality. The model allows 
wages in the informal sector to be affected by the introduction of the minimum wage 
(0)
– an effect captured by the parameter πm . This model also allows workers to move 
to the informal sector as a response to the minimum wage – this event is captured by 
the parameter πd 
(1)
. Combined, these unemployment and sector mobility effects allow 
the minimum wage to affect the relative size of the formal sector in the economy, 
which in turn can affect labor tax revenues. 
A two-sector model helps to interpret the parameters identified in the previous work 
from Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006). Meyer and Wise discuss the possible 
reasons that one would observe a non-zero density of wages below the minimum, 
such as uncovered jobs and non-compliance in covered sectors. Ultimately, however, 
Meyer and Wise’s model identifies the aggregate likelihood of non-compliance (πd). 
This parameter is the proportion of workers who, following the introduction of the 
minimum wage, do not ultimately respond to the policy. An application of the law of 
iterated expectations shows that the parameter estimated in their model is a weighted 
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average of the sector-specific parameters, with weights given by the latent shares of 
the sectors in the economy. The parameter πd does not identify whether workers earn 
sub-minimum wages because they would already be working in non-covered sectors 
regardless of the policy or because they moved there as a response to the policy. These 
two different stories are implied by different values of the sector-specific parameters. 
However, they can imply the exact same value for πd. Moreover, any combination of 
the two is also equally likely when one estimates only the aggregate or “unconditional” 
parameter πd. Thus, the sector mobility parameter πd 
(1) 
and the latent size of the 
uncovered sector Pr[S(0) = 1] are more economically meaningful than the aggregate 
parameters. 
3.5. Model Analysis 
In this section, I show that this model can capture a wide range of potential effects of 
the minimum wage policy. To do so, I discuss the model’s implications for some objects 
of interest, such as the sector-specific wage densities and the conditional probability 
of formality given the wage. 
Given assumptions 2 to 4 above, there is a relationship between the latent and ob-
served unconditional wage distributions. It is given by: f(w) = 1I{w < m}πd(w)f0(w) + R R c m πm(w)f0(w) m (1)1I{w = m} dw + 1I{w > m}f0(
c
w) , where c ≡ 1 − πu Λ(w)f0(w)dw is a c 
rescaling factor that ensures both densities integrate to one. This parameter has the 
interpretation as the ratio of employment in the presence of the policy to that in the 
absence of the policy. 
Regarding the relationship between the sector-specific parameters and the aggregate 
(1) (0) (1) (0)
ones, we have πd(w) ≡ Λ(w)πd + (1 − Λ(w))πd , πm(w) ≡ Λ(w)πm + (1 − Λ(w))πm , 
and πu(w) ≡ Λ(w)πu (1) . The parameters πd(w), πm(w) and πu(w) are weighted averages 
of the sector-specific parameters with weights given by the relative shares of each 
sector in the latent distribution. They describe the unconditional probability of non-
compliance, “clustering” at the minimum wage level and unemployment at a given 
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Figure 3.— Dual-economy Model: Latent and Observed Densities 
value of the wage. These are the parameters estimated in the previous approach 
employed by Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006).23 
Examining the sector-specific wage density, one can see that for the formal sector, we 
m F0(m|S(0)=1) +1I{w > m}f0(w|S(0)=1)have: f(w|S(1) = 1) = 1I{w < m}0+1I{w = m}π
(1) 
c(1) (1) 
. 
c
1I{w < m}πd(w)f0(w|S(0)=0)For the informal sector, we have f(w|S(1) = 0) = +(0)(1−Λ(w))c
1I{w = m}π
(0) 
m F0(m|s(0)=0) +1I{w > m}f0(w|S(0)=0) , where I define c(1) ≡ 1−F0(w|S(0) = c(0) c(0) R(1) (1) m Λ(w)1)(1 − πm ) and c(0) ≡ 1+ π f0(w|S(0) = 0)dw so that both densities inte-d 1−Λ(w) 
grate to one. They have the interpretation of the ratio of employment observed in the 
sector to that in the absence of the policy. Figures 1 and 3 display the relationship 
between the latent and observed densities for the aggregate wage distribution, for the 
formal sector, and for the informal sector, respectively. 
The dual-economy model preserves the same relationship between the latent and 
observed unconditional wage densities as in Meyer and Wise’s model. However, the 
dual-economy model presents heterogeneity in the responses to the minimum wage 
across sectors. The formal sector wage density below the minimum wage vanishes, 
whereas in the informal sector, the density grows according to the inflow of workers 
from the formal sector. As a result, the density in the informal sector below the min-
imum wage can, for some values of the model parameters, present a discontinuity at 
23Note that, here, they are allowed to be functions of w as long as the latent sizes of the sectors 
differ across wages and the model parameters differ across sectors. 
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Figure 4.— Dual-economy Model: Latent and Observed Conditional Probabilities 
the minimum wage with the “inverse” shape relative to that observed in the aggregate 
wage distribution. 
Regarding the conditional probability of working in the formal sector as a 
function of the wage, we have: Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) = w] = 1I{w < m}0 + R(1) mπm f0(w)Λ(w)dw1I{w = m} R + 1I{w > m}Λ(w). Figure 4 graphically displays the re-m πm(w)f0(w)dw 
lationship between the latent and the observed probabilities of formality with respect 
to the wage. The model offers a sharp prediction concerning the effect of the minimum 
wage on the conditional probability of the sector given the wage. It states that for 
values above the minimum wage, this probability is equal to the latent probability 
(Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) > m] = Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) > m]). It states that the proba-
bility of working in the formal sector given the wage will be zero for values below 
the minimum wage. At the minimum wage level, it should be a particular constant R(1) mπm Λ(w)f0(w)dw( R ), which is likely different from this function’s left and right limits. m πm(w)f0(w)dw 
This result follows from the fact that workers are not able to maintain wages below 
m in the formal sector and the assumption of the absence of spillovers above the 
minimum wage level. 
It is helpful to understand the implications of the model using limiting cases for 
the parameter values. For example, if πd 
(1) 
tends to zero, there is no mobility between 
sectors. At the other extreme, when πd 
(1) 
tends to one, all affected workers in the 
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formal sector manage to find a job in the informal sector, which also implies no 
employment effects from the minimum wage. In general, the employment effect will 
be given by πu 
(1)
F0(m|S(0) = 1)Pr[S(0) = 1], which means that the employment 
loss will be higher when the mass of workers for whom the minimum wage “bites” is 
larger, and when the size of the formal sector is larger. In terms of market structures 
(1)
that could generate these values, πd tends to one if the economy can be described 
by a simple two-sector model with imperfect compliance with the minimum wage and 
(1)
costless sector mobility. πm tends to be higher if the economy primarily consists of 
(1)
employers with monopsonistic power in the labor market, and πu tends to be higher 
if the labor market operates close to perfect competition and mobility to the informal 
sector is limited. 
4. IDENTIFICATION 
It is not possible to directly use the techniques developed in Doyle (2006) in each 
sector separately, as I have introduced movements between them. To identify the 
model, a different approach must be used. Below, I state the main identification results 
of this paper, which concern the identification of (a) the latent joint distribution 
of sector and wages; that is, the distribution that would prevail in the absence of 
the minimum wage; (b) the vector of parameters π that governs how the minimum 
wage affects the economy; (c) the effects of the minimum wage on functionals of the 
distribution of sector and wages; and (d) the effects of the minimum wage on labor tax 
revenues. In what follows, assume that the econometrician observes a random sample 
of the pair {(Wi(1), Si(1))} of size N from a population of interest. I also assume the 
following easily verifiable technical conditions: the minimum wage m is set at a point 
with non-zero density, that is, f0(m) > 0, Pr[W (1) < m] > 0, and Λ0(m; β) 6= 0. 
Lemma 4.1 (Identification of sector-specific parameters) Under Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, and 4, π is identified. Proof: See Appendix A. 
Lemma 4.2 (Identification of latent distributions) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 
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3 and 4, the latent joint distribution of sector and wages is identified. Proof: See 
Appendix A. 
Corollary 4.3 (Identification of the minimum wage treatment effects) 
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the effects of the minimum wage on functionals of 
the joint distribution of sector and wages are identified. Examples of such functionals 
are the effects of the minimum wage on average wages, on the standard deviation of 
wages, on quantiles of the wage distribution, on the size of the formal and informal 
sectors and on the average wages conditional on sectors. 
Corollary 4.4 (Identification of the minimum wage effects on labor tax 
revenues) 
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 and assuming no tax revenues from the informal 
sector, the effects of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues are identified. Identifi-
cation of the effects of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues holds as long as the 
effects can be written as a functional of the latent and observed wage distributions 
and the model parameters π. 24 
The key points that permit the identification are as follows: The shape of the 
relationship between sector and wages for values above the minimum wage is preserved 
in the presence of the policy. This allows us to obtain estimates of the latent share of 
the formal sector for values below the minimum wage level by extrapolating the curve 
we observe in the upper part of the wage distribution.25 The identification of the latent 
wage density builds on the approach in Doyle (2006) in the sense that the probability 
24See Section 6.3 for further discussion of this issue. 
25The relationship between latent sector and wages can only be observed for values above m. 
If this function is specified non-parametrically, the latent share of formal workers for values below 
m would essentially be unidentified. However, by relying on the parametric functional form, I can 
extrapolate the relationship observed above m to predict the latent share of workers that would 
prevail below the minimum wage in the absence of the policy. This is achieved by estimating the 
parameters of the function Λ(w) using wages above m and then using the estimated parameters for 
the prediction for all wages, both above and below m. 
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of non-compliance with the policy is identified using the ratio of the density of wages 
above and below the minimum wage level. To complete the identification, the sector-
specific parameters are identified using the derivative of the wage density.26 
Figure 5.— Dual Economy Model: Latent and Observed Conditional Probabilities 
under Independence 
5. ESTIMATION 
In this section, I discuss how to estimate the model parameters and latent distribu-
tions using non-parametric kernel methods. The non-parametric estimation strategy 
used here is local linear density estimators. 
As in Doyle (2006), the model can also be estimated without assuming that the 
latent wage distribution belongs to a known parametric family. A crucial step in 
obtaining non-parametric estimates of the objects of interest, such as the model pa-
rameters and the counterfactual distributions, involves the estimation of a ratio of 
one-sided limits of the density at the minimum wage. The estimation of these quanti-
ties can be performed using non-parametric methods. Note that because the density 
is discontinuous around the minimum wage, only observations below the minimum 
are informative for limw→m− f(w) (and similarly for the density above the minimum). 
26If latent sector and wages are independent, one need not resort to the derivative of the wage 
density at m. In this case, identification of the sector-specific parameters can be achieved by exam-
ining the distribution of wages given the sector. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of this 
issue. 
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This implies that the estimators of these quantities will behave as if the minimum 
wage were a boundary point of the density, which has implications in terms of bias 
and variance. 
Therefore, it is advisable to use methods ensuring that the performance of the 
density estimator is satisfactory on points that are close to the support boundaries. I 
use local linear density estimators, which have the same order of bias at the boundary 
as at interior points of the distribution.27 In Appendix C, I formally describe how to 
non-parametrically perform the density estimation. 
For the remaining terms that need to be estimated, I will use the plug-in approach 
and replace the unknown objects in the identification section with their consistent 
fb(m−)estimators. Thus πbd(m) ≡ b , where fb(m−) is the estimator of the density just f(m+) 
below the minimum wage value using the local linear density estimator. In addition,   
0 fb0(m−) fb(m−) fb0(m+)for the estimator of πd0 (m), we can define πbd (m) ≡ fb0(m+) − b b . f(m+) f(m+) 
To complete the process of recovering the structural parameters π, one requires esti-
mates of Λ(m) and Λ0(m). These objects are the latent share of the formal sector and 
the change in it at m. For that purpose, one needs to estimate β. Given Assumptions 2 PNand 3, the estimator can be defined as: βb≡ arg minβ (Si −Λ(Wi; β))21I{Wi > m}.i=1
Then, given that we estimated β, we can plug it into the function Λ(.) to ob-btain an estimate of Λ(m) and Λ0(m). They will be given by Λ(m) = Λ(m; βb) 
and Λb0(m) = Λ0(m; βb). Using the estimate Λ(b m) of the latent share of the for-
(1) (0)
mal sector, we can define the plug-in estimator for the parameters πd and πd : 
(0) b (1)Λ(m) (0)πb πd(m) − π0 π πd(m) − (1 − b b ] · b .≡ b b (m), and b ≡ [b Λ(m)) · π Λ(m)−1 To d Λb0(m) d d d 
complete the estimation, we first need to estimate c before we recover the latent 
m fb(u)wage density: bc ≡ [ R du + 1 − Fb(m)]−1 . Then, the estimates of the latent wage 
πbd(u) 
27This estimator builds on the idea of local linear conditional mean estimators. It begins by 
dividing the support of the density into a set of bins. Then, a “response variable” is defined as the 
bin counts of these disjoint intervals. After this process, one is left with a vector containing the 
“independent variable,” which are the bin centers, and a corresponding “dependent variable,” the 
bin counts. Finally, standard local polynomial smoothing estimates are applied to these constructed 
variables. See McCrary (2008) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
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TABLE I 
Descriptive Statistics 
b bf (w)bc f (w)= m, as: bdistribution can be defined, for w 6 f0(w) = 1I{w < m} + 1I{w > m} .πbd(w) cb
The consistency of the πb, Λ(w) and βb and, consequently, b fb(w) follows directly 
from the identification equations and the consistency of fb(w) and fb0(w). Closed-
form expressions for the asymptotic variances can be derived. However, I will rely on 
resampling methods to estimate them in the empirical application. 
6. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN BRAZIL 
For my empirical application, I consider a stronger version of Assumption 2: 
Assumption 5 Independence: Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Λ ∀ w. 
This assumption implies that latent sector and wages are independent. Figure 5 
displays the relationship between the latent and observed conditional probabilities 
of formality with respect to the wages under this assumption. This assumption is 
testable. Below, I provide evidence that it is not violated in the context of the Brazilian 
labor market. 
Independence greatly simplifies the identification and estimation, as can be seen 
in Appendix B. Independence (and the absence of spillovers) allows me to identify 
the latent share of the formal sector by examining the observed share of the formal 
sector for wages that are above the minimum wage level. Moreover, it implies that 
the aggregate minimum wage probabilities (πd(w),πm(w),πu(w)) do not vary across 
wages even if the parameters differ across sectors. This is because the latent share 
of each sector becomes constant with respect to wages. This allows me to identify 
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TABLE II 
Descriptive Statistics by Sector 
Formal Sector Informal Sector Difference 
Wage 874.599 556.114 318.485*** 
(1.716) (3.755) (3.661) 
Female 0.359 0.340 0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
White 0.583 0.482 0.101*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education 10.246 8.840 1.406*** 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Tenure 4.639 3.134 1.505*** 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.017) 
Age 33.312 32.003 1.309*** 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.030) 
Minimum wage worker 0.103 0.151 -0.047*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
N 420,097 159,155 -
the model parameters by simply examining the discontinuity in the aggregate wage 
distribution at m and the sector-specific wage distributions, so I will not need to rely 
on estimating the first derivative of the wage distribution at the boundary point, m. 
In Appendix B, I describe how to identify the model under this condition. The 
estimation strategy I use follows the same method as in the general form of the 
model. That is, I estimate the density of wages at the boundary using local linear 
density estimators and use a plug-in method for the remaining objects. Namely, once 
I estimate the lateral limits of the density of wages at m, I complete the estimation 
by replacing the objects in the identifying equations using their respective sample 
counterparts. In the next sections, I describe the data and discuss the results obtained 
when estimating this model for the Brazilian labor market. 
6.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To evaluate the effects of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes, I used 
data for the period from 2001 to 2009 from the PNAD dataset. These data have been 
collected by the IBGE – which is a Portuguese acronym for “Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics” – since 1967 and contain information on income, education, 
labor force participation, migration, health and other socioeconomic characteristics 
of the Brazilian population. Workers who do not report wages, those who work in 
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TABLE III 
Descriptive Statistics: Conditional Probabilities 
Pr[S = 1] Pr[S = 0] Pr[W = m] Pr[W < m] 
Unconditional 0.738 0.262 0.116 0.073 
Conditional on sector 
Formal 1.000 0.000 0.103 0.006 
Informal 0.000 1.000 0.151 0.265 
Conditional on wage 
W < m 0.056 0.944 0.000 1.000 
W = m 0.659 0.341 1.000 0.000 
W > m 0.811 0.189 0.000 0.000 
Conditional on gender 
Male 0.732 0.268 0.099 0.066 
Female 0.748 0.252 0.147 0.088 
Conditional on race 
White 0.773 0.227 0.082 0.047 
Non-white 0.694 0.306 0.157 0.107 
Conditional on education 
Less than 5 years 0.576 0.424 0.180 0.179 
Less than 12 years 0.672 0.328 0.143 0.108 
More than 12 years 0.797 0.203 0.041 0.022 
Conditional on region 
South 0.803 0.197 0.062 0.040 
Southeast 0.778 0.222 0.079 0.041 
Center-West 0.706 0.294 0.129 0.050 
North 0.623 0.377 0.182 0.106 
Northeast 0.608 0.392 0.246 0.198 
Note: N = 579,252 
the public sector and workers who are older than 60 years of age or younger than 18 
years of age were removed from the sample. The PNAD dataset includes information 
on the worker’s labor contract status, which was used to define formality. 
The variable of interest – the wage – is measured at the monthly level, which is the 
most natural unit in the Brazilian institutional context. A feature of the Brazilian 
labor market is that wages are typically specified at the monthly level, the same unit 
of measure as the minimum wage. The labor contract also establishes the number of 
hours of work per day (typically 6 or 8 hours).28 I will treat the wage reported in the 
survey as the contracted wage, so no adjustment for hours need to be performed. As 
a result, wages below the minimum wage are not, in principle, a result of a “division 
bias”. 
The empirical strategy will assume also that the wage is measured without error. 
This is unquestionably a strong assumption. The observed wage distribution presents 
28At the end of the month the worker will receive a payment “pro rata” based on the actual 
number of days he or she worked. This payment will present some small variation across months 
due to reasons such as holidays, absences, overtime pay and the like. 
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Figure 6.— Wage Densities 
Note: Local linear density estimates using Silverman’s rule of thumb bandwidth. 
heaping at round numbers. I will show that the estimates of the parameters of the 
model are fairly robust to the presence of heaping by using different values of the 
bandwidth in the density estimation. 
As mentioned above, all workers in Brazil carry an official document called “Carteira 
de Trabalho” (worker’s card). This document is signed by the employers in the formal 
act of hiring. The lack of a formal signed labor contract means that the employer is 
not forced to collect labor taxes or to comply with the minimum wage and other 
types of regulation. The Brazilian economy is known to be characterized by a large 
informal sector. Tables I, II, and III illustrate this fact and describe the main features 
of the data.29 
Figure 7 displays the empirical CDFs of the formal and informal sectors. A few 
interesting facts can be noted: The empirical cumulative distribution of wages seems 
to have a spike at the minimum wage level in both sectors, and virtually no worker 
29All estimates are computed using survey weights. 
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Figure 7.— Empirical CDFs 
in the formal sector receives wages below m. The same pattern appears on Figure 6, 
where I display the estimates of the wage density of the formal and informal sectors. 
Thus, informality is closely related to sub-minimum wages. However, these concepts 
are not equivalent, as a sizable fraction of informal workers earn wages above the 
minimum wage level. 
Table II shows that workers in the informal sector earn on average approximately 
36% less than workers in the formal sector. In addition, in terms of the observable 
characteristics, workers in the informal sector are more likely to be male, non-white, 
less educated and young. Considering the likelihood of earning minimum and sub-
minimum wages, Table III shows the heterogeneity of these probabilities across popu-
lation subgroups. For example, white workers are 48% less likely to earn the minimum 
wage than are non-white workers. Workers with less than 5 years of education have an 
approximately 18% likelihood of earning the minimum wage, whereas the correspond-
ing likelihood is only 4% for workers with more than 12 years of education. Regarding 
29 
Figure 8.— Real Wages and Minimum Wage Evolution 
the geographic variation, workers in the South Region have a 6% probability of earn-
ing the minimum wage, whereas workers in the Northeast have an approximately 25% 
probability of earning the minimum wage. A similar heterogeneity pattern appears 
when we consider the probability of earning sub-minimum wages. 
Table III shows that formality presents considerable heterogeneity across observable 
characteristics. It shows that the probability of formality is close to zero for workers 
with wages below the minimum wage, as predicted by the dual-economy model. Also, 
it shows that the probability of working in the formal sector is lower for low education 
groups, non-white, and in the North and Northeast regions. 
The history of the minimum wage in Brazil began during the Getulio Vargas gov-
ernment, on May 1st, 1940. Initially, the minimum wage varied across regions to 
accommodate differences in price levels across the country. Subsequently, in 1984, 
regional minimum wages were unified into a single wage at the national level.30 The 
periodicity of changes in the minimum wage has been annual since the economy stabi-
lized in 1994 (Lemos, 2009). Figure 8 depicts the evolution of average wages, minimum 
wage, and different quantiles of the wage distribution over the last decade.31 
Regarding Figure 8, the challenge of relying on time-series variation to identify the 
30The Constitution of 1988 prohibited the use of the minimum wage as a reference for wage 
bargaining for other categories of workers and contracts. The aim of this prohibition was to reduce 
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Figure 9.— Kernel Density Estimates 
Unconditional Wage Distribution 
effects of the minimum wage becomes clear, as there is nearly as much evidence in 
favor of the minimum wage affecting the 20th percentile as there is of it affecting the 
80th percentile.32 The correlation between minimum wage changes and changes in 
such high percentiles of the wage distribution is likely a reflection of the pro-cyclical 
nature of changes to the minimum wage. Given this, effects of the minimum wage on 
other objects such as average wages or lower quantiles that are based on time-series 
variation should also be interpreted with caution. 
6.2. Main Results 
In this section, I will discuss the results obtained after estimating the model for 
the Brazilian labor market. The model is estimated (separately) for the years 2001 to 
the over-indexation of the economy, which was thought to be fueling inflation. 
31Real wages displayed in Figure 8 were computed using the IPCA, a Portuguese acronym for 
“Nation-wide consumer price index”. IPCA is the consumer price index used by the Central Bank 
in its inflation target system. 
32A similar point was made by Lee (1999) when analyzing U.S. data. 
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TABLE IV 
Model Parameter Estimates by Year 
2009. As discussed in the estimation section, all objects in the model can be estimated 
by replacing the population object with its sample analog. The only exception to 
this is the density of wages at the boundary. To estimate this object, I use a local 
linear kernel estimator with a normal kernel and a bandwidth equal to eight times 
Silverman’s rule of thumb, which has been shown to be mean squared error optimal 
in Monte Carlo simulations. In the robustness section, I show that the estimates are 
not sensitive to this choice by using McCrary’s automatic bandwidth selection rule. 
Figure 9 shows a plot of the observed density of wages and its latent counterpart. We 
can see that, as a consequence of sizable unemployment effects, the observed density 
above the minimum wage is higher than the latent density. Due to both truncation 
at the minimum and unemployment, the observed density below the minimum wage 
is smaller than the latent density. The estimates of the model parameters used to 
construct this latent density are shown in Table IV. 
In examining the point estimates and standard errors in Table IV, we see sizable 
estimates of the unemployment effects of the minimum wage. This result is comparable 
to the estimates of πu obtained in other applications of this approach. Doyle, for 
example, found that approximately 60% of young workers who would earn below the 
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TABLE V 
Distributional Effects of the Minimum Wage 
minimum became unemployed. A possible explanation for this regularity is that the 
reduced-form and panel data approach, such as the work of Card and Krueger (1994), 
estimates the effects of marginal changes in the minimum wage, whereas I estimate 
the effect of the minimum wage when compared to the counterfactual scenario defined 
as the absence of it. High unemployment probabilities can generate a small marginal 
effect of the minimum wage, depending on the size of the density around the minimum 
wage and the magnitude of the change in the minimum wage. 33 
The evidence from Table IV also suggests that sector mobility is limited. The es-
timates of the sector-mobility parameter (πd 
(1)
) are approximately 12%, with a max-
imum of 22%. I discuss in greater detail the implications of this result in Section 
6.3. 
As seen in Figure 8, the period of 2001 to 2009 is characterized by an increase in 
the real value of the minimum wage. We should expect the estimates of the mass of 
33Jales (2015) discusses the predictions of this Dual-economy model for marginal changes in the 
minimum wage under a parametric assumption for the latent distribution of wages. 
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TABLE VI 
The Geographic Heterogeneity of Minimum Wage Effects 
affected workers, F0(m), to reflect this feature of the data. Regarding Table IV, we 
observe a close relationship between the minimum wage level and estimates of F0(m). 
The correlation coefficient with the minimum wage level is approximately 0.90.34 
Table V shows how the minimum wage affects the shape of the (log-) wage distri-
bution. Here, I compute the effects of the minimum wage on the usual measures of 
wage inequality, such as the standard deviation of log wages and the Gini coefficient. 
The estimates show that the minimum wage has a positive impact on average wages 
(conditional on employment). The maximum difference is .39 log points in 2007, and 
the minimum is .18 in 2002. The minimum wage also reduces wage inequality, as mea-
sured by differences in quantiles, the standard deviation, or the Gini coefficient. These 
estimates indicate the trade-off faced by policy makers when choosing the minimum 
wage level. On the one hand, there is a gain in terms of reducing wage inequality and 
increasing average wages. On the other hand, workers tend to have more difficulty 
finding jobs. 
The Brazilian economy is characterized by considerable geographic variation in the 
size of the formal sector, as shown in Table III. The size of the formal sector in the 
34The results also suggests a high correlation over time between unemployment estimates (πu) 
and the minimum wage level. 
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Southeast region is approximately 0.78, whereas in the Northeast region the size of 
the formal sector is approximately 0.61. Table VI shows the model parameter esti-
mates separately for the Southeast and Northeast regions. In the Northeast region 
the minimum wage “bites” at a much higher point in the wage distribution when 
compared to the Southeast. The latent size of the formal sector in the Southeast is 
0.81. In the Northeast region, the latent size is 0.76. These regions also differ in their 
responses to the (same) minimum wage policy. In the Southeast, we observe a high 
probability of unemployment (0.65). We also observe a low estimate of the sector 
mobility parameter (0.04). In the Northeast, we observe a lower probability of unem-
ployment (0.33), higher probability of non-compliance (0.33), and higher probability 
of moving to the informal sector (.26).35 
(0) (0)
Regarding the informal sector parameters, πd and πm , I do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across regions. This suggest that the 
differences we observe in the joint distribution of sector and wages across these re-
gions come from differences in their latent distributions and differences in the formal 
sector’s response to the minimum wage. A decomposition exercise based on the esti-
mates from Table VI show that approximately 72% of the differences in the observed 
size of the formal sector between the Northeast and the Southeast are a result of the 
minimum wage. The remaining 28% of the differences in the size of the formal sector 
across these regions are due to other economic factors that cause the Southeast to 
have a larger size of the formal sector beyond their differences in the minimum wage 
effects. This exercise indicates that the minimum wage affects a substantially larger 
proportion of workers in the Northeast economy, thereby inducing a larger inflow of 
workers to the informal sector in that region. 
35The region where the latent size of the formal sector is higher also presented a higher likelihood 
of sector mobility. This result may also suggest that formal and informal sectors operate in most 
cases in distinct labor markets, in the sense that they are located in different geographic regions or 
different industries. This could be one explanation for the small estimates of the likelihood of sector 
mobility found in the aggregate economy. 
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TABLE VII 
Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Tax Revenues 
6.3. Tax Revenues and the Size of the Informal Sector 
A comparison of Tables I and IV shows that the minimum wage reduces the share 
of the formal sector in the economy. This occurs through two different but related 
channels: First, the minimum wage reduces the size of the formal sector as long as the 
unemployment effects are greater than zero, as has been found in Brazil. Second, the 
minimum wage increases the size of the informal sector through sector movements 
that are driven by the policy itself. Overall, the share of the formal sector in the 
Brazilian economy is reduced by approximately 9% as a result of the minimum wage 
policy.36 
For this reason, the minimum wage indirectly affects the government budget.37 The 
minimum wage affects the shape of wage distribution, the relative size of the formal 
sector and the likelihood of employment. Each of these effects has the potential to 
alter tax revenues. 
The goal of this section is to derive an estimate of these effects. I consider the 
effects on revenues from the INSS tax, which is the Brazilian labor tax. The INSS 
is collected to fund the social insurance system in Brazil, and the rate is 20% for 
companies included in the regular system of taxation and 12% for small companies 
36My estimates imply that the mass of workers at and below the minimum wage level is inconsistent 
with absence of disemployment effects under smooth non-compliance probabilities and a continuous 
latent distribution of wages. The “missing” mass of workers at or below the minimum wage level 
is attributed in the model to unemployment effects of the policy. Similarly, high sector-mobility 
(1)
probabilities (π ) are inconsistent with my estimate of the latent share of the formal sector and d 
the density of low-wages in the informal sector. That is, we do not observe enough small wages in 
the informal sector to justify larger sector mobility parameter estimates. 
37Here, I use the term “indirectly” because the minimum wage affects the government’s budget 
through the spending channel. This is due to the indexation of pensions to the minimum wage. 
36 
that opt for the “simplified” system. To estimate the effects, I will rely on the following 
assumption: 
Assumption 6 No Tax Revenues in the Informal Sector 
Let T (1) represent the tax revenues in the formal sector under the imposition 
of a minimum wage and T (0) in its absence.38 By definition, we have T (1) ≡ PN PNτ (Wi(1))Wi(1)Si(1), and T (0) ≡ τ(Wi(0))Wi(0)Si(0). The object of in-i=1 i=1 
terest is the ratio between these two quantities. After some algebra, we have R ≡ 
T (1) Pr[S(1)=1] E[τ (W (1))W (1)|S(1)=1]= · c · . This expression is further simplified in the 
T (0) Pr[S(0)=1] E[τ (W (0))W (0)|S(0)=1] 
Brazilian case, where labor taxes are a constant fraction of wages. In this case, R is 
Pr[S(1)=1] E[W (1)|S(1)=1]given by: R ≡ T (1) = · c · . Thus, the effects on tax revenues can 
T (0) Pr[S(0)=1] E[W (0)|S(0)=1] 
be decomposed into three components: compression of the formal sector, employment 
effects, and change in expected wages in the formal sector.39 This equation shows that 
the tax effect of the minimum wage will depend on the relative magnitude of these 
effects.40 
I compute the tax effects of the minimum wage using a plug-in approach for the 
components of the equation above based on the model parameter estimates from 
Table IV. Table VII displays the estimated effects. The minimum wage policy seems 
to generate sizable unemployment effects and to reduce the size of the formal sector. 
These effects are large enough to compensate for the increase in expected wages. 
Therefore, the minimum wage reduces the mass of wages in the formal sector, with a 
corresponding decline in labor tax revenues. The estimates range from 3% in 2001 to 
11% in 2007.41 
38Note that I abuse notation here and use N to refer to the size of the population, not the size of 
the sample. 
39The expression for R, the effect of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues, relies exclusively 
on Assumption 6. It does not rely on the particular assumptions I used for the dual economy-model. 
40Note that the parameter R also answers a related question: Is the mass of wages, the sum of the 
wages of all workers in the formal sector, higher under the minimum wage or in its absence? Because 
the tax rate τ is a constant function of the wages, the effects on tax revenues are proportional to 
the effects on the mass of wages. 
41As a sensitivity test, fixing all other parameters, the employment effect of the minimum wage 
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Figure 10.— Formality vs. Wages 
Note: Conditional probabilities estimates based on a local-constant estimator using an Epanechnikov kernel and the 
standard “rule of thumb” bandwidth. 
6.4. Testing the Underlying Assumptions and Robustness Checks 
This research design allows me to indirectly test some of model assumptions.42 
First, I will indirectly test Assumption 5, the independence between latent sector and 
wage. This assumption is testable in different ways. One way to test it is to consider 
the proportion of workers in each sector as a function of the wage. If the assump-
tion holds, this proportion should not vary with the wage for wage values that are 
above the minimum.43 A naive regression of formality on wages should mechanically 
detect a negative relationship because no worker in the formal sector can earn below 
the minimum wage. However, after restricting our attention to wage values above the 
minimum, the relationship should disappear. Another related way to test the assump-
tion is to examine the CDF conditional on wages above the minimum. If the model is 
correct, differences in the observed wage distributions across sectors at values above 
in 2009 needs to be approximately 28% smaller than my estimates for the minimum wage to have 
no effect on labor taxes. Similarly, the minimum wage effect on average wages needs to be under-
estimated by at least 29.6% for the minimum wage to have no impact on labor tax revenues. This 
suggests that the model needs to be severely misspecified for the estimates of the direction of the 
effect to be wrong. 
42I discuss the theory behind the tests performed in this section in Appendix D. 
43See Figure 5. 
38 
Figure 11.— Formality vs. Log-wages 
Note: Conditional probability estimates based on a local-constant estimator using an Epanechnikov kernel. 
Bandwidth: 0.03. 
the minimum will only be due to rescaling induced by unemployment and sector mo-
bility. Thus, by conditioning on values above the minimum, the effects of rescaling 
and sector movements should disappear, and the densities should be approximately 
the same. 
Figures 10, 11, and 12 provide visual evidence of the accuracy of this assumption 
within the Brazilian context. Above the minimum wage level, the proportion of work-
ers in the formal sector of the economy does not seem to systematically vary with 
the wage. Figure 11 shows that this is also true when we inspect the relationship 
between formality and log-wages.44 This evidence supports the assumption that the 
underlying latent density of wages should be the same between sectors. The plots of 
the empirical CDFs in Figure 12 across formal and informal sectors point in the same 
direction: Workers in the formal and informal sectors apparently draw from similar 
distributions for wages above the minimum wage. This suggests that the differences 
between the overall distribution of wages occur as a result of the different ways in 
which the sectors respond to the minimum wage. Note, however, that the assump-
44Under Assumption 5 there should be no relationship between formality and any function of the 
wage above the minimum wage level. 
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Figure 12.— Empirical CDF by Sector above the Minimum Wage 
tion required for identification is that the entire wage distribution be the same across 
sectors. The presence of the minimum wage prevents me from testing this condition 
for values below m. Thus, it is still possible that the latent wage distributions are 
indeed equal conditional on wages above the minimum wage, while this is not the 
case for values below it. This last part of the identifying assumption is untestable. 
The evidence that the wage distributions are similar for values above the minimum 
wage seems to indicate that they may also be so for values below m in the absence 
of the policy. However, this conclusion is subject to debate. 
Table VIII shows the estimates of the elasticity of formality with respect to the wage 
based on a linear probability model, using different restrictions on the sample. The 
relationship between sector distribution and wages becomes substantially weaker after 
one conditions the regression to only consider wages above the minimum. Regarding 
the coefficient while conditioning on higher values, several estimates that are not 
different from zero were found. 
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TABLE VIII 
Formality vs. Wages - Linear Regression Estimates 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
W > 0 1.93*** 2.15*** 2.77*** 2.43*** 2.73*** 2.63*** 2.76*** 2.51*** 0.72 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.34) (0.15) (0.62) (0.15) (0.48) (0.59) 
W > m 0.87*** 0.71*** 0.99*** 0.79*** 0.54*** 0.61*** 0.73*** 0.51*** 0.09 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11) (0.16) 
W > 1.5m 0.40*** 0.26*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.12* 0.15** 0.17** 0.02 -0.03 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
W > 2m 0.15** 0.07 0.34*** 0.08 -0.07 0.07 0.08 -0.05 -0.08* 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) 
Note: Estimates of the (100 times the) elasticity of formality with respect to the wage at the minimum wage level, 
using different sample restrictions. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Another maintained assumption of the model is that the latent wage density is 
continuous around the minimum. If the wage density is continuous, then my estimates 
should not reveal any effect for values other than the minimum wage. 
Table IX displays the estimates of the ratio of the left and right limits of the 
wage density for values different than the minimum wage pooling data from all years 
(normalizing the minimum wage to zero). I display the point estimates for using two 
values for the bandwidth: the same bandwidth as in Table IV and a bandwidth half of 
its size. I perform the placebo test at 20 different points, from R$200 to R$300 above 
the minimum wage. The point estimates tend to be around one, which should be the 
case in the absence of a discontinuity. Using the baseline bandwidth, the estimates 
range from 0.88 to 1.17. 
However, the null hypothesis of no gap is still rejected at several points. Discontinu-
ities of such small magnitude are likely a result of “heaping” at round numbers. If a 
discontinuity of similar size is present in the latent wage density, then the magnitude 
of the bias on the estimates of the model structural parameters would be of negli-
gible economic significance. All the qualitative implications of the model parameter 
estimates based on the continuity assumption would remain valid.45 
45I discuss in Appendix E.3 the consequences of estimating the model incorrectly assuming con-
tinuity for the latent wage distribution. The estimators of the probabilities of non-compliance and 
“clustering” at the minimum wage will be inconsistent if the latent wage distribution is discontinuous 
at the minimum wage level. The ratio between the true structural parameters and the (probability 
limit of the) estimators will be given by the magnitude of the discontinuity in the latent density 
at the minimum wage level. For example, adjusting the estimates for a discontinuity of 0.92 in the 
latent density increases the estimate of πd for the year 2001 from 0.20 to 0.22. Similarly, πm increases 
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TABLE IX 
Placebo Tests: Discontinuity Estimates using Values Other than the Minimum 
Wage 
Wage 
Baseline 
200 
Half 
Baseline 
300 
Half 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
1.007*** 0.929*** 0.993*** 1.111*** 1.130*** 1.173*** 1.097*** 0.920*** 0.961*** 0.882*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
1.039*** 0.876*** 1.003*** 1.191*** 1.178*** 1.161*** 0.969*** 0.654*** 0.742*** 0.579*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
1.029*** 0.907*** 0.894*** 1.076*** 1.084*** 1.104*** 1.046*** 0.899*** 1.059*** 0.995*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
0.901*** 0.698*** 0.737*** 1.081*** 1.101*** 1.174*** 1.031*** 0.760*** 1.023*** 0.865*** 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
As a robustness check, I investigate the sensitivity of my estimates to the choice of 
bandwidth and the presence of spillovers. A key parameter of the model, πd, is iden-
tified by the ratio of the wage density above and below the minimum wage. In the 
baseline specification, the estimation was performed using local linear density estima-
tors with the bandwidth equal to eight times Silverman’s rule of thumb. I estimate πd 
using the automatic bandwidth selection procedure proposed by McCrary (2008). The 
estimates of πd, available through request, range from 11 to 16%, whereas with the 
baseline bandwidth they range from 11 to 23%. Thus, I tend to find slightly smaller 
estimates of the likelihood of non-compliance using the automatic bandwidth selection 
procedure. The qualitative implications of the results, however, remain similar. 
In Appendix E.5, I discuss the identification of the effect of the minimum wage 
on the size of the formal sector under the presence of spillovers. Identification of the 
latent size of the formal sector can be achieved by assuming that spillovers vanish 
at a point higher up in the wage distribution. My spillover-robust estimates of the 
impact of the minimum wage on the size of the formal sector are approximately -14%. 
Thus, these estimates are higher than the baseline estimates from Table IV that are 
obtained under the assumption of absence of spillovers. This suggests that the -9% 
effect from the baseline estimate underestimates of the true effect of the minimum 
wage on the size of the formal sector if Assumption 3 is violated. 
from 0.26 to 0.28. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This paper develops a dual-economy model to analyze the effects of the minimum 
wage in a country with a large informal sector. I discuss the conditions under which 
the effects of the policy are identified using only cross-sectional data on wages and 
sector (defined by formality status) and the same level of the policy is applied to all 
workers. I show that the discontinuity of the wage density at the minimum wage level 
identifies the probability of non-compliance with the policy, and the latent relationship 
between sector and wages can be recovered using data on wages and sector above the 
minimum wage. I then show that the latent joint distribution of sector and wages 
can be identified based solely on data on sector and wages. This result allows me to 
estimate the impact of the policy on a broad range of labor market outcomes, such 
as expected wages, unemployment, wage inequality, the size of the formal sector, and 
labor tax revenues. 
The main results are that the minimum wage significantly alters the shape of the 
lower part of the wage distribution and thereby reduces wage inequality. My estimates 
show that expected wages increase by approximately 16% and the Gini coefficient de-
creases by approximately 24%. However, the minimum wage policy generates sizable 
unemployment effects and a reduction in the size of the formal sector of the economy. 
My estimates imply a decrease of approximately 9% in the size of the formal sector. 
This result is due to both unemployment effects on the formal sector and movements 
of workers from the formal sector to the informal sector as a consequence of the 
policy. My estimates also indicate that the latent size of the formal sector is approx-
imately four times larger than the informal sector. Thus, small movements from the 
formal to the informal sector still induce a sizable change in the relative size of the 
informal sector. My estimates show that the minimum wage increases the size of the 
informal sector by approximately 39%. Together, these effects imply a reduction in 
the tax revenues collected by the government to support the social welfare system of 
approximately 6%. 
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The research design based on the sharp contrast in the effects of the minimum wage 
between workers on each side of the minimum wage value allows for indirect tests of 
the underlying identification assumptions of the model. The graphical and statisti-
cal evidence supports the maintained assumptions. The robustness checks performed 
produced similar results to those of the baseline estimator. 
There are, however, several limitations of this strategy. A fully structural model of 
workers and firms behavior is not specified. Thus, this approach does not recover deep 
parameters of the economy such as the elasticity of labor demand.46 An extended 
version of the dual-economy model presented in this paper that fully incorporate 
optimizing behavior from the workers’ side, such as a Roy-model of sector choice, is 
the object of ongoing research. 
REFERENCES 
[1] Rita Almeida and Pedro Carneiro. Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Infor-
mality. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(3):pp. 64–89, 2012. 
[2] David Card and Alan B Krueger. Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case 
Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American 
Economic Review, 84:774–775, 1994. 
[3] Richard Dickens, Stephen Machin, and Alan Manning. Estimating the effect of 
minimum wages on employment from the distribution of wages: A critical view. 
Labour Economics, 5(2):109–134, 1998. 
[4] Joseph J Doyle Jr. Employment effects of a minimum wage: A density disconti-
nuity design revisited. Technical report, 2006. 
[5] Hugo Jales. Measuring the Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment, For-
mality and the Wage Distribution: A Structural Econometric Approach. Tech-
nical report, 2015. 
46As long as the underlying structure of the economy implies the assumptions of the dual-economy 
model used in this paper, the estimates of the effects of the minimum wage should be similar. 
44 
[6] David S Lee. Wage Inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rising Dis-
persion or Falling Minimum Wage? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3):977– 
1023, 1999. 
[7] Sara Lemos. Minimum Wage Effects in a Developing Country. Labour Eco-
nomics,, 16(2):224–237, 2009. 
[8] Enlinson Mattos and Laudo M Ogura. Skill differentiation between formal and in-
formal employment. Journal of Economic Studies, 36(5):461–480, October 2009. 
[9] Justin McCrary. Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discon-
tinuity design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2):698–714, 2008. 
[10] R H Meyer and D A Wise. Discontinuous Distributions and Missing Persons: 
The Minimum Wage and Unemployed Youth. Econometrica, 51, Issue:1677–1698, 
1983. 
[11] Coen N Teulings. Aggregation bias in elasticities of substitution and the mini-
mum wage paradox. International Economic Review, 41(2):359–398, 2000. 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN A DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY: A DENSITY DISCONTINUITY DESIGN APPROACH, SUPPLEMENTAL 
MATERIAL 
APPENDIX A: IDENTIFICATION 
This section I prove identification of the parameters of the model and the joint 
distribution of latent sector and wages under the assumptions of the Dual-Economy 
model. In what follows, assume that the econometrician observes a random sample 
of the pair {(Wi(1), Si(1))} of size N from a population of interest. I also assume the 
following easily verifiable technical conditions: the minimum wage m is set at a point 
with non-zero density, that is, f0(m) > 0, Pr[W (1) < m] > 0, and Λ0(m; β) 6= 0. 
Lemma A.1 (Identification of sector-specific parameters) Under Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, and 4, π is identified. 
Lemma A.2 (Identification of latent distributions) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 
3 and 4, the latent joint distribution of sector and wages is identified. 
Proof: Given Assumptions 3 and 4, the relationship between the observed density 
and the latent one can be written as: 
(1) f(w) = 
⎧ ⎪⎪⎪⎨ R πd(w)f0(w) c m πm(w)f0(w) dw 
c 
if 
if 
w < m 
w = m⎪⎪⎪⎩ f0(w) 
c if w > m. 
Given Assumptions 2, 3 and 4, the latent share of the formal sector Λ(w(0)) 
is identified using the information above the minimum wage. This is true because 
1 
2 
Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) = w] when w > m. Then, we have: 
Z ∞ 
β0 = arg min (Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) = u] − Λ(u; β))2f(u|W (1) > m)du. 
β m 
Furthermore, we have that Λ(w; β0) = Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] for all w. 1 Given 
Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, we have: 
f(m − )
πd(m) = lim→0+ . 
f(m + ) 
Moreover, regarding the derivative of the wage density, we have: ⎧ ⎨ πd(w)f0(w)0 πd(w)f (w)+ if w < m 0 0
(2) cf 0(w) = ⎩ c f0(w) if w > m. 
c 
0 
Then, it can be shown that: 
  
f 0(m − ) f(m − ) f 0(m + )
π0 (m) = lim→0+ − · .d f 0(m + ) f(m + ) f(m + ) 
Because the RHS of this equation contains only objects of the observed wage distribu-
tion, this implies that πd
0 (m) is identified. Given that the function Λ(m) is identified, 
we have: 
(0) Λ(m)
πd = πd(m) − · πd
0 (m)
Λ0(m) 
(1) (0)
πd = [πd(m) − (1 − Λ(m)) · πd ] · Λ(m)
−1 . 
This can be shown using the equation below and its derivative with respect to the 
1Note the importance of all w in this sentence. This means that once we recover β0, we can 
forecast Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] for values of w that are below the minimum wage level. It should 
be clear here why non-parametric estimation of the conditional probability of sector given the wage 
is not an option. By assuming a parametric form, I can use the parameters to predict the latent 
probability of sector given the wage for values at which, in the data, this probability is equal to zero 
due to the minimum wage policy. 
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wage: 
(1) (0)
πd(w) = πd Λ(w) + πd (1 − Λ(w)). 
Given that all terms of the equation above are identified, we have that the function 
πd(w) is identified. Inverting the relationship between the observed and latent wage 
densities, we have: ⎧ ⎨ f(w)·c if w < m 
πd(w)(3) f0(w) = ⎩ f(w) · c if w > m. 
Which implies: 
Z m f(w) 
c = [ dw + 1 − F (m)]−1 . 
πd(w) 
Because the function πd(w) is already identified and F (m) is simply the fraction 
of workers in the observed wage distribution who earn less than or equal to the 
minimum wage, c is identified. This implies the identification of the entire latent 
wage distribution f0(w). Using the latent wage density and the function Λ(w) allows 
the identification of the latent densities of the formal and informal sectors and, finally, 
(1) (1)
the remaining parameters πm and πu . 
Pr[S(0)=1|W (0)=w]·f0(w) Λ(w)·f0(w)f(W (0) = w|S(0) = 1) = = R 
Pr[S(0)=1] Λ(u)f0(u)du 
Pr[S(0)=0|W (0)=w]·f0(w) (1−Λ(w))·f0(w)f(W (0)|S(0) = 0) = = R 
Pr[S(0)=0] (1−Λ(u))f0(u)du 
(1) Pr[W (1)=m|S(1)=1] 1−F0(m|S(0)=1)πm = · 1−Pr[W (1)=m|S(1)=1)] F0(m|S(0)=1) 
(1) (1) (1)
πu = 1 − πd − πm 
(0) (0)
πm = 1 − πd . 
Q.E.D. 
4 
It is important to note that the identification result holds if one assumes that 
(1) (1) (1)
πm and πu are non-specified functions of the latent wage, as long as πd remains 
constant. In this scenario, the parameters recovered above are expectations - E(πd
1) 
(1)
and E(πu ) - over the distribution of workers whose latent wages are below the 
(1)
minimum wage. Formally, the parameters identified are πm = Pr[W (1) = m|S(0) = 
1,W (0) < m] and πu 
(1) 
= Pr[W (1) = .|S(0) = 1,W (0) < m]. Under the maintained 
assumptions, this probability is the same for all workers regardless of their latent 
wage. In the case in which workers are heterogeneous in the probability of becoming 
unemployed, or receiving the minimum wage, with respect to their latent wages, 
the model recovers the natural extension of this parameter in the presence of such 
heterogeneity. That is, it recovers the average effect for the population of affected 
workers. Interestingly, this does not imply that the latent wage distributions obtained 
under the assumption of constant probabilities will be inconsistent. The assumption 
of constant probabilities is maintained only to simplify the exposition.2 
Further, it should be stressed that this proof does not require the wage distribution 
to peak above the minimum wage. In fact, one can identify the effects of the minimum 
wage regardless of where in the latent wage distribution the minimum wage happens 
to be set, as long as the density of wages is greater than zero at the minimum wage, 
(1) (0)
πd and πd are constants and either one of them is greater than zero. 
Corollary A.3 (Identification of the minimum wage treatment effects) 
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the effects of the minimum wage on functionals of 
the joint distribution of sector and wages are identified. 
Proof: The identification of treatment effect parameters follows directly from the 
identification of the joint distribution of observed and latent sector and wages from 
i.i.d data on {(Wi(1), Si(1))}. Q.E.D. 
2This will hold as long as the part regarding the probability of non-compliance is correctly specified 
with respect to latent wages – for example, if it is constant. See more on this in Appendix 3. 
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APPENDIX B: IDENTIFICATION UNDER INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN SECTOR AND 
WAGES 
In this section, I discuss the identification given the independence between (latent) 
sector and wages, that is, Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Λ ∀ w. I maintain Assump-
tions 1 (continuity), 3 (no spillovers) and 4 (minimum wage effects). Given those 
assumptions, the aggregate wage density will be given by: ⎧ 
πdf0(w) if w < m⎪⎪⎪ c⎨ 
πmF0(m)(4) f(w) = if w = m⎪⎪⎪ c ⎩ f0(w) if w > m. 
c 
This is exactly the one-sector version of this model, as proposed by Doyle (2006). 
This means that at least the aggregate parameters πd, πm and πu are identified as: 
f(m − )
πd = lim→0 . 
f(m + ) 
To identify πm, one simply needs to verify that: 
Pr[W (1) = m]
πm = πd · . 
Pr[W (1) < m] 
Given πd, F0(m) can identified by: 3 
Pr[W (1) < m]
F0(m) = . 
πdPr[W (1) > m] + Pr[W (1) < m] 
3See the section on the identification of Doyle’s model. 
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The relationship between the aggregate data parameters πd and πm and the sector-
specific model parameters can be derived as: 
(1) (0)
πd = Λπd + (1 − Λ)πd 
πm = Λπ
(1) + (1 − Λ)π(0) m m 
= Λπ(1)πu u 
(1) 
+ π(1) + π(1)π = 1 d m u 
(0) 
+ π(0)π = 1.d m 
Having recovered the aggregate parameters, the goal is solve for the sector-specific 
parameters. To do so, one first needs to identify Λ. Note: 
Λ ≡ Pr[S(0) = 1] = Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) > m] = Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) > m], 
where the first equality holds because of the independence between latent sector 
and wages, and the second holds due to the lack of spillovers on sector probabili-
ties. Interestingly, the identification of the latent size of the formal sector does not 
rely on anything but independence, the lack of spillovers, and the assumption that 
Pr[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0.4 This means that we can correctly identify the size 
of the formal sector even if we mis-specify the continuity of the latent distribution of 
wages or the way in which that the minimum wage affects the lower tail of the wage 
distribution. Note that, given the aggregate data parameters and Λ, this is a sys-
tem of five equations and five unknowns. Unfortunately, the system is rank deficient, 
and hence, an additional equation needs to be added to recover the sector-specific 
(1)
parameters. Relying on the identification of Λ , πu is identified by: 
π(1) 
πu 1 − πd − πm 
= = .u Λ Λ 
4Pr[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0 is implied by Assumption 4. When Assumption 4 does not hold, 
the identification strategy described above will be valid if Pr[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0. An example 
of this situation is when the probability of non-compliance is a function of the worker’s latent wage. 
This would invalidate Assumption 4 while preserving the condition Pr[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0. 
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(1)
To recover πm , it is necessary to consider the density of the formal sector: 
⎧ 
0 if w < m⎪⎪⎪⎨ 
(1)
πm F0(m)(5) f(w|S(1) = 1) = if w = m 
c(1)⎪⎪⎪⎩ f0(w) 
c(1) 
if w > m, 
(1) = 1−F0(m)(1−π(1)where c m ) is a scaling factor such that the two densities integrate 
(1)
to one. The key feature of the formal sector that allows for the identification of πm 
is that because the density is zero below the minimum wage, the scaling factor on 
the denominator is a function of only one unknown parameter (note that F0(m) is 
already identified). Finally, using: 
Pr[W (1) = m|S(1) = 1] = π(1)F0(m)/c(1) ,m 
it is possible to show that: 
Pr[W (1) = m|S(1) = 1] 1 − F0(m)
π(1) = · .m 1 − Pr[W (1) = m|S(1) = 1] F0(m) 
The RHS of this equation consists only of quantities that are already identified. Given 
(1)
that πm is identified based on the expression above, we can now return to the system 
and recover all the other parameters: 
(1)− Λπ
π(0) 
πm m 
= .m 1 − Λ 
Thus: 
(0) 
= 1 − π(0)π .d m 
8 
Finally: 
(1) − π(1)= 1 − π(1)π .d m u 
The latent wage density can be recovered in the same way as in the baseline model, 
that is, by inverting the relationship and using the fact that c and πd were already 
identified: ⎧ ⎨ f(w)·c if w < m 
(6) f0(w) = 
πd ⎩ f(w) · c if w > m. 
This implies that we have identified the latent distribution of wages f0(w), the latent 
size of the formal sector Λ and the parameters π that govern how the minimum wage 
affects the economy. 
Note that estimation in this context is considerably easier than in the baseline 
model. This is the case because it is not necessary to estimate the derivative of the 
density of wages at m to solve for the sector-specific parameters. All objects in the 
identifying equations – except by the lateral limit of the density of wages at m – can be 
estimated by replacing the population object with its respective sample counterpart. 
I used this plug-in method to estimate the parameters of the model in the empirical 
application. 
APPENDIX C: ESTIMATION 
C.1. Local Linear Density Estimation 
In this section, I describe the local linear approach to density estimation. A stan-
dard approach to non-parametrically estimate densities at boundary points is to use 
a local linear density estimator. This estimator builds on the idea of local linear con-
ditional mean estimators. It begins by dividing the support of the density into a set 
of bins. Thereafter, a “response variable” is defined as the bin counts of these disjoint 
intervals. After this process, one is left with a vector containing the “independent 
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variable,” which is the bin center, and a corresponding “dependent variable,” the bin 
counts. Finally, standard local polynomial smoothing estimates are applied to these 
constructed variables. The discussion and notation here will follow the approach ad-
vocated by McCrary (2008) in the context of testing for manipulation in RD designs. 
To begin, define g(wi) as the discretized version of the wage support for a bin size 
equal to b. 
⎧ ⎨ bw−m bcb + + m if w =6 m 
g(w) = b 2 ⎩ m if w = m, 
where bac is the greatest integer in a. 5 Clearly, it holds that g(w) ∈ χ ≡ {..., m − 
5 b b ,m − 3 b ,m − b , m, m + ,m +3 b ,m +5 b , ...}. I will call the jth element of this set 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
Xj. 6 Define the normalized cell size for the jth bin Yj = 1 
PN 1I{g(Wi) = Xj } .Nb i=1 
Let K(.) be a symmetric kernel function satisfying the usual properties and let h be 
a bandwidth satisfying the conditions h → 0 , nh →∞, (nh)1/2h2 → 0 and b/h → 0 
. Then, the local linear estimator of the density and its derivative are defined, for 
w 6= m, as: 
⎡ ⎤ 
f (w)⎣ b ⎦ = arg min(a0,a1 )0 PJ (Yj − a0 − a1(Xj − w))2K( wj −w )(1I{Xj > m}1I{w > m} + 1I{Xj < m}1I{w < m}). 
fb0(w) j h 
APPENDIX D: TESTING 
This research design allows us to perform partial tests of the validity of the model’s 
assumptions. This section I describe how these tests can be performed and their 
limitations. 
Assumption 1, the continuity of the latent wage distribution, can be verified by 
5As discussed by McCrary, the greatest integer in a is the unique integer Q such that Q < a < Q+1 
(round to the left). In software, this is known as the “floor” function. 
6As discussed in McCrary (2008), the endpoints X1 and Xj may always be chosen arbitrarily 
small (large) such that all points in the support of the distribution of wages are inside one of the 
bins. 
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visual inspection of the histogram and the kernel density estimates using different 
values for the bandwidth. Formally, this condition can be tested by performing a 
placebo test, that is, by checking whether there are differences between the left and 
right limits of the density estimates at wage points other than the minimum wage. 
Assumption 2 can be tested by comparing the fit of the parametric model with non-
parametric smoothing estimates. If Λ(w; β) is correctly specified, for the true value 
of the parameters β0, we have: 
Z ∞ � 2 
Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = u] − Λ(u; β0) f0(u)du = 0. 
m 
While this equation is in terms of latent variables, we can restate it using observables 
by relying on Assumption 3. Thus, we have: 
Z ∞ � 2 
I ≡ Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) = u] − Λ(u; β0) 1I{u > m}f(u)du = 0, 
m 
where β0 ≡ arg minβ E[(Si(1) − Λ(Wi(1); β))21I{Wi(1) > m}]. This condition is in 
terms of quantities we can observe. Correctness of the specification of the model 
for Λ(W (0), β) implies that I = 0. This is a integrated mean squared error type of 
condition that can be used for specification testing (see Pagan and Ullah (1999)). 
The idea behind it is to compare the fit of a parametric model with the fit of a 
non-parametric model. This type of comparison can be used to identify the proper 
functional form for the sector-wage relationship. This is relevant because part of the 
identification relies on extrapolating this conditional mean function to values below 
the minimum wage.7 It should be noted, however, that this is, at best, a partial test of 
7There are also parametric versions of these tests. For example, testing Assumption 2 in a para-
metric setting can be achieved by increasing the order of the polynomial of the wage and testing 
the restriction that the higher order terms are equal to zero. In the simplest case in which one has 
a linear logit of the sector given the wage, the correctness of the specification can be tested by 
estimating a model in which the square of the wage is added as a regressor and assessing whether 
the coefficient associated with the squared term is different from zero. 
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the assumption. There are some deviations from the null for which this test does not 
have the power to reject. To make this point clear, observe the following condition: 
Z ∞ � 2 
Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = u] − Λ(u; β0) f0(u)du = 0. 
−∞ 
This condition is equivalent to the correctness of the specification of the parametric 
model for the conditional probability of the latent sector given the wage. The crucial 
difference between this condition and that used in the test above is that it can detect 
when the model is incorrectly specified for values below the minimum wage. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to create a feasible version of this condition, as once we move 
from latent to observed wages, all information on the conditional probability of latent 
sector given the wages is lost for values below the minimum. In sum, it is conceivable 
that the parametric functional form holds for values above the minimum wage but 
fails to hold for values below it. This part of the assumption remains untestable. 
It is also possible to test Assumption 4. In Assumption 4, the probabilities that 
capture the effects of the minimum wage are defined. A restriction imposed by that 
(1) (0)
assumption is that the probabilities of non-compliance (πd and πd ) are invariant 
across workers with different latent wages in the same sector.8 This is a restrictive 
assumption, as workers whose latent wage is close to the minimum wage level could 
be more likely to comply with the policy than workers whose latent wage is far from 
the minimum. To see why this assumption is testable, one must first examine the 
second derivative of the observed wage density: 
⎧ 
π00 πd(w)f
00(w)(w)f(w) (w)f 0(w)n⎨ n + 2π0 + if w < m 
c c c(7) f 00(w) = 
f 00(w)⎩ if w > m. 
c 
8One can see that in aggregate, the likelihood of non-compliance πd(w) will be a function of latent 
wages due to changes in the composition of each sector as we move along different wages. 
12 
If the continuity assumption on the latent wage distribution is strengthened up to 
− f 00the second derivative, that is, if limw→m+ f0 
00(w) = limw→m 0 (w), then we have: 
 cf 00(m − ) − π00  d (m)f0(m) − 2πd0 (m)f00 (m)lim→0+ cf 00(m + ) − = 0. 
πd(m) 
Intuitively, we can test Assumption 4 because by examining the second derivative, we 
have added another equation while the number of parameters remained the same. This 
provides us the overidentification condition that allows us to test the model.9,10,11 
APPENDIX E: ROBUSTNESS 
This section demonstrates how generalizable the inferences based on the model are 
when the model is misspecified or when we fail to obtain data on other determinants 
of the joint distribution of sector and wages. I claim that (i) the model is still correctly 
specified if the unobserved heterogeneity affects either the model parameters or the 
latent wage distribution, but not both, (ii) the model correctly identifies the desired 
features of the data when the model parameters are allowed to vary across latent wages 
and individuals under some restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity, (iii) the odds 
ratio of clustering at the minimum wage (πm) versus non-compliance (πd), and the 
9This is easier to see in the case in which one assumes a linear probability model for Pr[S(0) = 
1|W (0)]. In this scenario, it is possible to find a closed-form solution for the model parameters using 
either the first or the second derivative of the wage density. These different ways of identifying 
the parameters must yield the same result if the model is correctly specified. However they do not 
coincide if the model is misspecified, that is, when the probabilities of non-compliance are functions 
of latent wages. 
10If one is willing to impose further smoothing conditions on the latent wage distribution, it 
is possible to identify the model by imposing flexible conditions on the relationship between the 
(1) (0)
parameters and the wages. For example, if one believes that (πd , π ) is appropriately described d 
by a quadratic (cubic) function, then one needs to go up to the third (fourth) derivative of the wage 
density to estimate the model parameters. 
11This condition is easier to test in the parametric version of the model. To do so, one simply 
(1)
needs to estimate a version of the model in which the probabilities of non-compliance π and πd(0)d 
are allowed to be a low-order polynomial of the latent wages and compute a likelihood ratio test that 
uses the baseline version of the model as a comparison. A rejection of the null indicates that the more 
general version is a better description of the economy, that is, the probabilities of non-compliance 
are indeed functions of latent wages. 
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latent share of the formal sector are correctly identified even when unemployment 
effects cannot be, and (iv) the aggregate parameters πd, πm and πu are correctly 
identified even when Assumption 2 does not hold or when unemployment effects are 
also present in the informal sector. 
To show (i), I reformulate the model and allow its parameters or distributions to be 
functions of potentially unobservable worker characteristics. I show that under some 
conditions, the assumptions I require for the baseline model to hold will still be valid. 
(ii) I reformulate the model under a random coefficients framework. I show that under 
reasonable conditions for the heterogeneity of the parameters across individuals, the 
estimands based on the baseline model identify the expectation of the distribution of 
parameters over the set of workers affected by the minimum wage. To show (iii), I 
prove that a lack of continuity implies the inconsistency of some, but not all, of the 
parameters of interest in the model. To show (iv), I recall that identification of Doyle’s 
aggregate parameters does not rely on all four assumptions that I use to identify the 
baseline model. 
These results reveal an important feature of the baseline model. It is easy and 
feasible to infer the direction that the parameter estimates will go when some of the 
model’s assumptions are violated. Moreover, as the identification is achieved using 
“separable” pieces – a model for the conditional distribution of sector given the wages, 
continuity of latent wage distribution to identify πd, and so forth – some of the 
results will still hold when the model is partially misspecified. Taken together, these 
features should increase the credibility of the results when there are some concerns 
with the correctness of the model specification. Some pieces of information based on 
this approach can be useful even in the worst case scenario in which the model is 
guaranteed to be inconsistent for some parameters. 
14 
E.1. Role of Covariates and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
By exploring the different effects of the minimum wage across sectors and the dis-
continuity of the density of wages around the minimum, one can estimate how the 
economy responds to this policy. This approach has some similarities to the quasi-
experimental Regression Discontinuity Designs. Because one of the main advantages 
of Regression Discontinuity Designs is to provide a way to avoid most of the endogene-
ity concerns associated with using observational data to infer causality, it is useful to 
discuss the extent to which these advantages are also present in this method. 
Assume that there is a random variable Z – say, for example, age – that is known 
to affect individual labor market conditions. One example is when workers with dif-
ferent values of Z draw from different latent wage distributions. Another way that 
Z can affect a worker’s labor market conditions is through the model parameters. 
For example, after the introduction of the minimum wage, younger workers might be 
more likely to move into the informal sector than older workers, which, in the model, 
(1)
would be represented by a higher πd . In these cases, is it necessary to estimate the 
model conditional on Z for the inferences to be valid? 
In the following discussion, I will always assume continuity of the Z-specific latent 
wage distribution, an absence of spillovers and a covariate-specific version of the 
assumption that describes the minimum wage effects. I will also assume the following: 
Assumption 1 Conditional probability of latent sector given the wage: 
Z 
Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] ≡ Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w, Z = z]f(z|w)dz = Λ(w; β). 
This assumption simply means that whatever the model for the conditional prob-
ability of the sector given the wage and Z is, this model can be aggregated to a 
unconditional one with parameters β. 12 Two sufficient conditions for the inferences 
12In general, this model will be more complex than the covariate-specific one. A simple, sufficient, 
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based on the unconditional wage distribution to be valid in the presence of covariates 
are the following: 
Case 1: 
Assumption 2 Equality of parameters: π(z) = π ∀z. 
When the effect of Z occurs through changes in the latent joint distribution of 
sector and wages but not through differential responses to the minimum wage, then 
Z can be safely ignored when making inferences with regard to the unconditional 
distribution. The reason for this result is simple. The assumptions above imply that 
all assumptions of the model for the aggregated data remain valid. 
Case 2: 
Assumption 3 Equality of latent distributions: W (0)|Z ∼F ∀z. 
This assumption means that Pr[W (0) < w|Z = z] = Pr[W (0) < w|Z = z0] for all 
(z, z0) and all w. By restricting the latent wage distribution to be the same for all 
values of z, inference based on the unconditional distribution ignoring the covariate 
will be valid when parameters are allowed to vary over Z. The parameters π recovered 
from the aggregate data will be weighted averages of the covariate-specific ones, with 
correct weights to reflect the share of each group of values of Z in the population. 
These, of course, are much stronger conditions than those in Case 1, as the role of 
covariates is severely limited when they are only allowed to determine wages through 
the differences in minimum wage effects. 
When both the latent wage distribution and the parameters are allowed to vary over 
Z, the estimate of πd can be interpreted as a local effect, as it recovers the likelihood 
of non-compliance for those with latent wages around the minimum wage.13 
but clearly not necessary, condition to guarantee that such a model will exist is when strengthened to 
Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w, Z = z] = Λ(w, β), that is, covariates only enter the conditional probability 
of sector given the wage though their effects on wages. 
13Preliminary results from simulations show that an unreasonably large degree of heterogeneity 
in both the latent distributions and the model parameters is necessary for the inference based on 
unconditional distribution to show sizable distortions. 
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The relevance of these results is quite small if the wage determinants are observable, 
as the model can be easily estimated conditional on these variables. If the estimation 
is performed while conditioning on the covariates, one need not be concerned with the 
cases above, meaning that the model parameters and latent joint distributions can 
be different for different values of Z. However, the situation differs when not all wage 
determinants are observable. Failure to observe wage determinants is a major source 
of bias in inferences based on regression models. In this design, this is not the case, as 
long as the model parameters remain constant over the distribution of the variables 
that are ignored, which seems to be a much easier condition to satisfy than the zero 
correlation usually assumed in regression models. In this sense, this research design 
resembles most of the characteristics of Regression Discontinuity Designs, overcoming 
the difficulties in assessing causal effects based on observational data due to endogene-
ity concerns. The reason for this is that the identification does not rely on variation 
in the minimum wage to assess the policy’s impact. Instead, identification relies on 
the sharp contrast between the effect of the minimum wage across individuals whose 
wages would fall on each side of it. Thus, concerns with omitted variable biases should 
be much more limited. 
E.2. Random Coefficients 
(π (ζ), π (ζ), π (ζ), π (ζ), π (ζ)), which is now ζ-specific. One way to inter-
In the model, a worker is characterized by a pair (Wi, Si) of ob-
served sector and wage, a vector (Wi(0), Si(0), ζi), and a vector (π(ζ) ≡ 
(1) (1) (1) (0) (0) 
n m u n m 
pret this is that we are treating ζ as the worker’s unobserved type. For now, I will not 
assume anything regarding the relationship between the worker’s type and his latent 
(0 (0)
wages. Of course, it still holds that πm (ζ) + πn (ζ) = 1 for all ζ and similarly for the 
formal sector parameters. This means, in addition to the worker’s latent sector and 
wages, he receives a draw for the model parameters. Here, I also allow this draw to 
be a function of the latent wage. Thus, for example, workers with higher latent wages 
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can have a higher probability of receiving the minimum wage versus becoming unem-
ployed. This extension captures the idea that (i) minimum wage effects might vary 
across dimensions of worker’s characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher 
and (ii) minimum wage effects can, and likely will, vary across workers with respect 
to the distance of their latent productivities from the minimum wage level. The rest 
of the model remains the same, meaning that I will retain continuity and the absence 
of spillovers. I will also assume independence between latent sector and wages for 
simplicity in the rest of this discussion. 
This extension adds a great degree of flexibility to the model. It relaxes Assumption 
4 in two ways. It allows different workers with similar wages to have different mini-
mum wage response probabilities in an unknown and unspecified way. It also allows 
workers in the formal sector to have different probabilities of becoming unemployed 
(1) (1)
(πu ) versus truncating at the minimum wage (πm )) for different values of the latent 
wage. Importantly, this can be achieved without relying on any specified functional 
form; that is, it is not assumed that these probabilities vary over latent wages in any 
parametric, continuous or known way. 
To analyze the model, we now need to define some new objects. Let: 
Z 
E(π(1) π(1)(ζ|w)) = (u)fζ|w(u)du.m m 
This expression defines the “average probability of truncation at the minimum wage 
for a formal sector worker with latent wage equal to w” as the integral of this proba-
bility for each worker’s unobserved type weighted by the proportion of each type for 
that wage value. We can analogously define similar objects for the other probabilities. 
Now, under this new set of assumptions, the relationship between latent and ob-
served densities will be given by: 
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⎧ 
E(πd(ζ|W (0)=w)f0(w) if w < m⎪⎪⎪ c⎨ R 
E(πm(ζ)|W (0)=u)f0(u)duf(w) = 
m 
c if w = m⎪⎪⎪⎩ f0(w) if w > m. 
c 
Now, let us consider the behavior of the estimands defined for the baseline model 
used under this, more general, version. 
f(m − )
πd ≡ lim→0 . 
f(m + ) 
It is easy to see that: 
f(m − ) (1) (0)
lim→0 = ΛE(π (ζ|W (0) = m, S(0) = 1)+(1−Λ)E(π (ζ)|W (0) = m, S(0) = 0). 
f(m + ) d d 
Now, it is also easy to see that this estimand will converge to the number that 
(1) (1)
we need if E(π (ζ|W (0) = w, S(0) = 1) = E(π (ζ|W = w0, S(0) = 1) andd d 
(0) (0)
E(π (ζ)|W (0) = w, S(0) = 0) = E(π (ζ)|W (0) = w0, S(0) = 0). This meansd d 
that the only restriction on the relationship between the types and latent wages is 
that the expectation of the non-compliance probabilities (taken with respect to the 
type distribution) is not a function of the wage. 14 
Assuming that this condition holds, we have that our baseline estimand 
f (m−)lim→0 identifies the expected value of πd over the population of affected indi-f (m+) 
viduals. That is: 
14This does not mean that the model is unidentified if this condition fails to hold. It means that 
in this case, we would need to rely on the derivatives of the wage density to identify the slope of the 
relationship between expected minimum wage probabilities and latent wages. This can be achieved 
in the same way as discussed in the testing section. 
MINIMUM WAGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 19 
f(m − )
lim→0 = Pr[W (1) = W (0)|W (0) < m]. 
f(m + ) 
Regarding the estimand of πm: 
Pr[Wi = m]
πm ≡ πd . 
Pr[Wi < m] 
It can be shown that: R m
Pr[Wi = m] E(πm(ζ)|W (0) = u)f0(u)du 
πd = R m = Pr[W (1) = m|W (0) < m],
P r[Wi < m] f0(u)du 
which means that πm converges to the expectation of the parameter over the popula-
tion of affected workers. The intuition for this result is that the estimand of πm comes 
from the point mass at the minimum wage level, which is obtained by integrating the 
probability of “clustering” at the minimum wage level for all workers whose latent 
wages are below the minimum wage level. Thus, irrespective of what functional form 
exists between the latent wage and the probability of receiving the minimum wage, 
this form simply reveals itself in the data in the form of the proportion of workers at 
the minimum wage level. The mass of wages at the minimum wage level has already 
“integrated out” the unobserved heterogeneity. This allows us to consider estimating 
Pr[W (1) = m|W (0) < m] without completely describing the shape of π(1)(ζ) as a m 
function of W (0). The term Pr[W (1) = m|W (0) < m,S(0) = 1] coincides with the 
(1) (1)
parameter πm as defined in the baseline model when πm is not a function of the latent 
(1)
wage. When πm is indeed a function of the latent wage (through unobserved types, 
for example), we can bypass the task of modeling this function and directly identify 
the aggregate component Pr[W (1) = m|W (0) < m,S(0) = 1]. Similar calculations 
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show that the same is the case with respect to the estimand of unemployment: 
1 − πd − πm = Pr[W (1) = .|W (0) < m]. 
Finally, it can be shown that the estimates for the implied treatment effects and 
latent densities will also converge to the correct values. This is a somewhat remarkable 
result, as it can be tempting to say that the way in which one understands the 
relationship between the heterogeneity in parameters and latent wages will necessarily 
determine the estimated latent densities that, in turn, will drive the results for the 
treatment effects. This result shows that this intuition is incorrect. As long as the 
(0) (1)
part that concerns the likelihood of non-compliance (πd , πd ) is reasonably specified, 
which can be achieved in a very flexible way by utilizing higher order derivatives of 
the wage density, all the results will hold. This result will hold even if unemployment 
or truncation at the minimum wage happen to have a unknown pattern that varies 
across individuals, unobservable characteristics, or latent wages. 15 
E.3. Lack of Continuity 
In the following discussion, I will assume independence between latent sector and 
wages. Now suppose that πd is not identified. This could be the case for two reasons. 
The first case is when latent wage distribution is not continuous. In this case, the 
estimate of πd actually identifies πdκ, where κ is the (unknown) size of the disconti-
nuity of the latent wage around the minimum wage. It is clear that as long as κ = 1, 
the estimate of πd will be consistent. The second case is when spillovers are misspec-
ified. For example, if one incorrectly assumes that spillovers are absent, when in fact 
they are present and reduce the density of wages just above the minimum wage,16 
15Of course, the marginal effects estimates will break down, as one needs to know not only the 
average probability of truncating at the minimum wage and unemployment but, more important, also 
the marginal probability to identify the effect of changes in the minimum wage level. The marginal 
probabilities will only be recovered if they either coincide with the average probability, as in the 
baseline version of the model, or if they have a known or estimable functional form. 
16This will be the case if one assumes that spillovers are weakly positive. 
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πd is misspecified because the density of wages observed just above the minimum 
wage is not the correct quantity to scale the density below to measure the extent of 
non-compliance. 
However, by using this identification strategy, one can compute bounds for the 
extent of non-compliance. For example, if spillovers are assumed to be weakly positive, 
meaning that workers above the minimum do not suffer wage cuts following the policy, 
then πd estimated when ignoring spillovers represent an upper bound of the likelihood 
of non-compliance. This will also provide an upper bound for πm and a corresponding 
lower bound for πu. Importantly, this means that the sizable unemployment effects 
found in the application cannot be explained by having a misspecified model for 
spillovers, as unemployment effects will necessarily be magnified in the presence of 
spillovers. 
Interestingly, some features of the minimum wage effects can still be correctly iden-
tified in this scenario. It is straightforward to see that the odds ratio of truncation 
versus non-compliance will still be correctly identified regardless of the lack of conti-
nuity in the latent wage distribution or misspecification of spillovers. Moreover, those 
quantities will be meaningful even if the correct specification for the minimum wage 
effects would need a more flexible form for the parameters – by making them vary 
Pr[W (1)=m]across individuals or latent wages, for example. In general, the statistic 
Pr[W (1)<m] 
Pr[W (1)=m|W (0)<m]will always identify , which is the ratio of the expected likelihood 
Pr[W (1)<m|W (0)<m] 
of truncating at the minimum wage versus not complying with the minimum wage 
for those directly affected by the policy.17. Interestingly, note that the same does not 
hold for the ratio of unemployment to either non-compliance or truncation. 
If the latent wage distribution present a discontinuity at the minimum wage level, 
then this identification strategy will identify πdκ. That is, the probability of non-
compliance will be scaled by the discontinuity in the latent wage density at m. Thus, 
17The conditions needed for this result are weak, namely, the lack of point mass at the minimum 
wage level in the latent wage distribution and a “no-crossing condition” that rules out workers higher 
up in the wage distribution receiving the minimum wage or less in the presence of the policy 
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if the discontinuity is of moderate size, the implied change in the estimated of πd will 
be of a small order.18 Thus, sizable distortions will be present only if the latent wage 
distribution presents large discontinuities at the minimum wage level. 
It should also be stressed that under independence between sector and wages, the 
latent share of the formal sector – which is perhaps one of the most relevant param-
eters of the model – is still identified regardless of misspecifying how the minimum 
wage affects the lower part of the wage distribution or a lack of continuity in the 
latent wage distribution.19 
E.4. Aggregate Parameters 
Doyle (2006) and Meyer and Wise (1983) define what I call “aggregated data” 
probabilities πd, πm and πu. I call them aggregated because they are a weighted aver-
age of the corresponding sector-specific likelihood of non-compliance, truncating and 
becoming unemployed. Because their goal is to compute aggregate data parameters, 
they do not need to have a correctly specified form for the conditional probability of 
the sector given the wage. 
The identification of the simplified version of the model here uses Doyle’s estimate 
as a first step. Then, the weights of the sector-specific probabilities are estimated, 
and finally, one can solve for the sector-specific parameters. This is a worthwhile 
exercise because, as I have shown above, a broader set of counterfactuals, such as 
labor tax and the size of the formal sector, analyses can be performed with sector-
specific parameters. Moreover, πd 
(1) 
is a parameter with more economic meaning than 
πd itself. 
Importantly, misspecification of either sector-specific assumptions or the form of 
the joint distribution of sector and wages has different consequences for the aggre-
18For example, if the left limit of the latent density of wages is 10% smaller than the right limit 
and πd is equal to 0.2, then the estimated probability limit of the estimator of πd based on this 
identification strategy will be 0.18, only 2 percentage points smaller than the true value. 
19The only additional assumption needed for that identifying this parameter is a lack of spillovers 
on sector probabilities. See the section on identification of the restricted version of the model. 
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gate parameters when compared to the sector-specific parameters. Two cases can 
illustrate this: If either (a) unemployment effects on the informal sector are present, 
which is ruled out by Assumption 4, or (b) the model for the conditional proba-
bility of the sector given the wages is incorrectly specified, then the sector-specific 
parameter estimators will be inconsistent. However, the aggregate ones will not be. 
It is straightforward to see this because neither Doyle or Meyer and Wise use this 
information. 
The results concerning the misspecification of the minimum wage effects, the joint 
distribution of latent sector and wages, spillovers or unknown heterogeneity of pa-
rameters point in the same direction. They show that the quantities obtained by the 
identification of the baseline model remain informative when some of the model’s 
assumptions are incorrectly specified. 
E.5. Robust Estimates of the Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Size of the 
Informal Sector 
This paper develops a model that allows one to estimate the effects of the minimum 
wage on a broad range of policy-relevant outcomes. Importantly, the model captures 
a channel through which workers move from the formal sector to the informal sector 
in response to the minimum wage policy. The effects of the minimum wage on the size 
of the informal sector have important policy implications. This parameter is key to 
understand the effects of the minimum wage on the government budget, for example. 
Under the assumptions of the model, this parameter, the effect of the minimum wage 
on the size of the informal sector, can be consistently estimated. This section discuss 
the extent to which those estimates are robust to deviations from these assumptions, 
in particular the absence of spillovers. This will be achieved using Assumption 5, the 
Pr[S(1)=1]independence between latent sector and wages. The object of interest is ,
Pr[S(0)=1] 
that is, the ratio of the size of the formal sector in the presence of the minimum wage 
versus its size in the absence of the minimum wage. The numerator of this fraction 
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can be directly estimated from the data. The counterfactual object is the latent size 
of the informal sector. Under independence between latent sector and wages, we have: 
Pr[S(0) = 1] = Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) > m] = Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) > m]. 
This expression uses the size of the formal sector above the minimum wage as 
the estimate of the latent size of the formal sector in the absence of the policy. 
Interestingly, this result does not rely on the continuity of the latent wage distribution 
or the correctness of the specification of the minimum wage effects on the bottom 
part of the wage distribution. It relies on the independence, the lack of spillovers 
assumptions, and Pr[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0. To evaluate the robustness of this 
estimate to departures from the absence of spillovers, one simply needs to specify 
a limit at which the spillovers should vanish. In the most extreme version of this 
assumption, the effects of the minimum wage vanish at the minimum wage level. 
However, one can specify that the minimum wage effects vanish at twice, or in general, 
k-times the minimum wage level. This lead to the following identification equation: 
Pr[S(0) = 1] = Pr[S(0) = 1|W (0) > km] = Pr[S(1) = 1|W (1) > km], 
where k is a number greater than or equal to one. The first equality follows from 
independence between sector and wages, whereas the second follows from the absence 
of spillovers at points higher than km. 20 Table I reports the effects of the minimum 
wage on the size of the formal sector based on different assumptions concerning where 
spillovers should vanish. The baseline estimates are approximately 10%. The estimates 
robust to spillovers find an effect of around 12 to 16%. The point estimates are signif-
icantly different. The qualitative conclusions, however, remain similar. The minimum 
20It is interesting to note that one can also add spillovers on wages above this threshold. The only 
restriction that needs to be imposed for this identification to be effective is the absence of spillovers 
on sector probabilities. That is, workers do not move across in response to the minimum wage if 
their latent wages are above km and Pr[W (1) > km|W (0) < km] = 0. 
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TABLE I 
Robust Estimates of the Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Size of the Formal 
Sector 
W>2m W>3m 
2001 0.867*** 0.853*** 
(0.002) (0.003) 
2002 0.853*** 0.844*** 
(0.003) (0.004) 
2003 0.865*** 0.849*** 
(0.003) (0.004) 
2004 0.847*** 0.845*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
2005 0.860*** 0.866*** 
(0.003) (0.004) 
2006 0.858*** 0.850*** 
(0.003) (0.004) 
2007 0.879*** 0.872*** 
(0.002) (0.004) 
2008 0.873*** 0.873*** 
(0.002) (0.003) 
2009 0.883*** 0.878*** 
(0.002) (0.003) 
wage has a sizable impact on the size of the formal sector. This section shows that 
those effects should be further magnified if spillovers are indeed present. These results 
are based on the minimal assumptions of independence and lack of spillovers in the 
upper part of the wage distribution. They are robust to limited spillovers, a lack of 
continuity in the latent wage distribution and misspecification of the minimum wage 
effects on the lower part of the wage distribution. 
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TABLE II 
Labor Tax effects under a “No Unemployment” assumption 
APPENDIX F: TAX EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
To provide an idea of the importance of the unemployment effects on the matter 
at hand, I will also compute the effects of the minimum wage on taxes based on a 
different model. In this version, I will force the unemployment effects to be equal 
to zero. By doing so, I no longer need to assume the continuity of the latent wage 
distribution. Formally, the model operates as follows. I will retain Assumptions 6 
(independence) and 3 (no spillovers). Assumption 4 will be modified to force πu = 0: 
Assumption 4 No Unemployment Effects 
Under the minimum wage, a fraction πd of workers will earn the same wage as in 
the latent wage distribution. The remaining fraction will earn the minimum wage. 
These fractions can be sector-specific as in the baseline model. Note that there is no 
Assumption 1 (continuity) in this case. Under these assumptions, the observed wage 
density will relate to the latent density by the following equation: 
⎧ 
πdf0(w) if w < m⎪⎪⎪⎨ 
f(w) = (1 − πd)F0(m) if w = m⎪⎪⎪⎩ f0(w) if w > m, 
where f0(w) is the latent wage distribution based on this different set of assump-
tions. In this case, we only need to estimate πd. One way to do so is by recognizing 
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that in this case: 
Pr[W < m]
πd = . 
Pr[W < m] + Pr[W = m] 
Therefore, a consistent estimator can be constructed by plugging in the maximum 
likelihood estimator of the respective quantity. With an estimate of πd, the latent 
wage density can be easily estimated by properly reweighting the observed wage 
density. Then, the tax effects of the minimum wage can be computed under the “no 
unemployment” assumption, given by: 
T (1) Pr[S(1) = 1] E(τ(W (1))W (1)|S(1) = 1) 
R ≡ = · . 
T (0) Pr[S(0) = 1] E(τ(W (0))W (0)|S(0) = 1) 
This is exactly the same expression as before without the unemployment component 
c. Importantly, the expected wages under the latent distribution also change, as the 
estimate of the latent distribution is different under this different set of assumptions. 
Table II reports the estimates of R for the years from 2001 to 2009. The estimates 
under the assumption of no-unemployment indicate that the minimum wage has a 
sufficiently strong effect on average wages to compensate for the reduction in the 
share of the formal sector due to sector transition. Moreover, note that the for the 
same data, the implied effect of the minimum wage on the average wages of those 
employed is, as expected, smaller when one assumes the absence of unemployment 
effects. 
